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The Liberal Treatment of Difference
An Untimely Meditation on Culture and Civilization
by Nigel Rapport
John Stuart Mill’s liberal vision included a notion of “civil advancement” whereby the free expression
of a diversity of opinion would result not only in an initial collision of difference but also in an
eventual consolidation as truth. The work of this article is to explore the ways and extents in which
such liberalism can translate into a cosmopolitan anthropology. Is toleration of difference the ap-
propriate anthropological ethic, or can one hypothesize a liberal “magnanimous” overcoming of
difference? In a wide-ranging discussion, the voice of Mill is juxtaposed against those of C. P. Snow,
Ernest Gellner, Stevie Smith, and Karl Popper. Much commentary would suggest that liberalism is
passe´. A political context dominated by renascent particularisms, militant religions, and resurgent
ethnicities spells the collapse, it is told, of any Enlightenment project of liberal-humanist universalism.
“Cultures are not options.” Notwithstanding, the argument is made here that as “opinion” grades
into “knowledge,” so “culture” grades into “civilization” and local community (polis) into global
society (cosmos). Difference may become a step along the way to a recognition of universal human
truth.
Social tolerance always; intellectual tolerance never.
(attributed to Ernest Gellner)
A Liberal Century, 1867–1964, and the
Untimely
The dates 1867–1964 are relatively arbitrary but not acciden-
tal. In 1867 John Stuart Mill took up the honorary position
of Lord Rector at the ancient Scottish university of St. An-
drews, and in 1964 C. P. Snow ended his three-year tenancy
of the same position. My intention in this article is an an-
thropological contextualization and appreciation of the lib-
eralism that is represented by these two figures and an ex-
amination of how their “liberal century” might be extended
into ours.
The Lord Rector is chosen every three years by the students
of the University of St. Andrews as their representative on
the university’s governing body, the University Court, and on
taking up the post, the incumbent delivers an inaugural ad-
dress. (The office of Lord Rector was created by the British
Parliament when it passed the Universities [Scotland] Act,
1858, at which time British university education was domi-
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nated by Scottish institutions; only Cambridge and Oxford
predated the Scottish quartet of St. Andrews, Glasgow, Ab-
erdeen, and Edinburgh.) The triennial election and installa-
tion at St. Andrews has come to contain elements of comedy
and public performance, and a number of well-known hu-
morists have recently occupied the role (John Cleese, Alan
Coren, Clement Freud). But this was not always the case, and
besides Mill and Snow, the title has also been bestowed on
Andrew Carnegie, Rudyard Kipling, and Fridtjof Nansen. A
skill in communication and in putting across a student per-
spective in a persuasive and yet personable fashion might
explain the advantage of being able to combine a comic touch
with a public gravitas: the Lord Rector, one might say, has to
speak student opinion to university establishment.
My first step will be the untimely juxtaposition of the in-
augural address delivered by C. P. Snow against that of John
Stuart Mill almost a century earlier. But I also intend the
“untimely” in a deeper, Nietzschean sense. From 1873 to 1876,
Friedrich Nietzsche published four wide-ranging “medita-
tions” that he denominated “untimely” for being unfashion-
able in content as well as transcendent of fashionableness. I
would write against what I see as a contemporary “culturalist”
fashion: the multiculturalist axiology and ethos in vogue in
the United Kingdom and elsewhere that sees culture under-
stood not “as an idiom or vehicle of intersubjective life, but
its foundation or final cause” (Jackson 2002:125). The fashion
is reificatory and essentializing. I would critique three tenets
of such a culturalist discourse: that cultural belonging is foun-
dational of human identity, that cultural difference is foun-
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dational of other differences, and that all knowledge is cul-
turally founded. My resource is the liberalism that was
formulated as a political and moral philosophy by the likes
of Mill and Snow, and it is with their publications and their
public addresses that I begin.
“On Magnanimity”
Charles Percy Snow (1905–1980) is perhaps best known for
his sequence of novels of British social, political, and intel-
lectual life, Strangers and Brothers. Narrated by the character
Lewis Eliot, the novels offer a semiautobiographical account
of life in provincial England, at Cambridge University, and
in London through substantial parts of the twentieth century
and taking in its major public events. The treasury of eth-
nographic detail within the novel sequence—akin to the nine-
teenth-century English accounting of Anthony Trollope
(about whom Snow was a passionate advocate)—has already
been mined by social anthropology (Gluckman 1962; Paine
1977).
Like Trollope, Snow also led a significant public life beyond
his novel writing. He began as a physicist before becoming a
civil servant in the British government, working in the Min-
istry of Labour and then of Technology. In 1959 he delivered
a celebrated Rede Lecture at Cambridge—later published as
Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1959)—which la-
mented the gulf between science and the humanities in West-
ern intellectual and public life.
“On Magnanimity” was the title Snow chose for his in-
augural address as rector at St. Andrews on April 13, 1961.
Magnanimity and courage, Snow (1962:6) observed, were the
virtues that he most admired in both public and private life.
Courage had already had its many advocates, and so, while
not meaning to set himself up as a “moral passport officer,”
he would like to take the opportunity to expound publicly
on a virtuous vision. For he could not help thinking that were
we to take stock of ourselves and others as individuals and
as societies “honestly,” or “in our freedom” (as Existentialism
has it), and then were we to act “generously” on the basis of
our discoveries, the world would benefit. Magnanimity entails
the human capacity and the practice of people seeing them-
selves “as they really are.” Also, one is generous and gives
others their due. Also, one is hopeful and endeavors to see
the best in oneself and in others, and then one works to
promote that best. Honesty, generosity, hopefulness, fulfill-
ment.
Snow’s words have an innocence to them and would have
had then, in the early 1960s, even before poststructuralism
urged us to see sophistry and subject positionality mediating
inexorably discursive construction. But Snow was not naı¨f,
however much his tone and verbal register in the public lec-
ture were direct. He elaborates. As practical virtue, magna-
nimity entails a complex process of self-awareness, relation-
ality, and betterment. It has complex roots. Magnanimity
arises out of a sense of human oneness, that while we are all
individual, we are also all the same, and we can and should
extend a brotherhood or love or compassion or charity to
this species whole. But magnanimity also arises out of a sense
of the real, a sense of human weakness and fallibility, and of
the moral liabilities, the social inequities and iniquities of
human interaction. One need not despise the apparently hy-
pocritical, then, if one were to recognize in statements that
fell short of actual gestures of magnanimity a desire often to
become better. Last, magnanimity arises out of vanity, a wish
and a belief that individually and collectively we may behave
better than we might. If magnanimity has murky roots, Snow
suggests, then so might all human excellence. And yet it is a
virtue to which he would look most hopefully as a practical
means to “sweeten and to glorify human life” (Snow 1962:
7). As an everyday lived awareness, Snow (1962) concludes,
“I want a man who knows something about himself. And is
appalled. And has to forgive himself to get along” (17).
Looking about him in England, however, Snow is saddened.
The practice of magnanimity is not widespread and appears
even to be on the wane. There is no doubting English tol-
erance—more so than in the United States, more so than any
society ever, in all likelihood—but England is not a magnan-
imous society. Malice lurks close beneath the polite surface
and frequently breaks cover. It is likely, Snow adjudges, that
this bespeaks a world power in decline; it is English fear and
frustration that breed hardness and hate, and such hatred is
easy while virtue is hard. Nevertheless, hate and negation
ultimately nauseate the soul, Snow insists, demeaning our
human dignity and potentiality. Not all human life need be
conducted in the narrow terms of envy and consideration
merely of the survival of one’s own. Our human capacities,
individual and collaborative, in particular our scientific and
technological means (thanks, in part, to the physical and
mathematical magnanimity of the likes of Einstein and Ruth-
erford), make the future ours to determine; we can do good
or ill with the world, but we cannot cut ourselves off from
it. It should be within our practical capacity, for instance, to
banish world hunger before a number of generations. Recall
how recently this was the widespread social condition in Scot-
land and in Ireland: practice the magnanimity to recognize
ourselves now in the two-thirds of the world’s population
who are poor enough to starve to death.
Snow sums up: a tolerant, polite veneer is not sufficient.
We can work at human improvement. But magnanimity as
a public virtue has the same private origin as do all social
characteristics and cultural traits. To practice political and
social virtue, we need first to recognize the truth of ourselves
as individuals and to endeavor to make the best of ourselves
as individuals. Being magnanimous, the individual, as a hu-
man Anyone, in his or her existential freedom, is honestly
willing to put himself or herself, and to put human fellows,
in a position where they might all make the best of themselves.
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“Inaugural Address at St. Andrews”
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was a civil servant and member
of Parliament as well as being Britain’s most significant nine-
teenth-century philosopher and author of the foundational
tract of liberalism as a political philosophy, “On Liberty”
(1963). He delivered his inaugural address as Lord Rector at
St. Andrews on February 1, 1867. The delivery reputedly lasted
3 hours, the lecture representing a not insignificant encap-
sulation of Millian themes and insights, with a particular focus
on the virtues inherent in university education.
Of the three main “ingredients” of human culture—knowl-
edge, morality, and aesthetics—Mill begins, it is the first to
which a university most devotes itself. But the latter are not
ignored. For the aim of a university education is to place the
student in a position to develop a taste for truth: to discrim-
inate and to ascertain. This includes the student choosing his
or her own moral path. A university aspires to being a public
space of “free speculation” where instruction is given in a
spirit not of dogmatism but of enquiry so that the student
learns to deploy intelligence to “seek for truth at all hazards”
(Mill 1963:353).
The best model of knowledge and also the best model for
knowing are provided by science. The natural sciences teach
us of the properties of the things in the world that we have
not made but that we have to live with and that operate
according to regular processes; the human sciences aspire to
the laws of human nature of whose study nothing is more
deserving of human attention. Science is not merely an in-
struction in facts, however, but also, and equally significantly,
a training in the disciplinary procedures by which truth is
everywhere ascertained: observation (plus experiment) and
reasoning. Physics and mathematics remain, respectively, the
best exemplars of these two routes to truth, but whatever the
individual’s path in life, the ascertaining and discriminating
of truth can be expected to be—should be expected to be—
his or her most incessant intellectual occupation. The knowl-
edge and the knowing that a university teaches, values, and
promotes, Mill (1963) asserts, eventuates in “elevating the
character of the species itself; exalting and dignifying our
nature” (350).
In the above paragraphs is contained the nucleus of Mill’s
humanist vision. The human individual—Anyone—has both
the capacity and the right to develop a worldview that fits
him or her personally, that does justice to his or her own
efforts of discovery, and that suits his or her own nature. In
this being true to self, moreover, truth itself may be reverenced
and furthered. This is so for two chief reasons. First, truth is
difficult, and human beings are fallible. In the diversity and
creativity of the individual search, the most various possibil-
ities of truth are construed, experimented with, and subjected
to reason—by self and other alike. Second, human beings are
creatures of habit: truth becomes dogma and ceases to be
appreciated and “lived” unless it is fully, frequently, and fear-
lessly—and individually—discussed. It is thus that the nature
of human individuality, truth, and the advance of the human
species can be said to amount to an objective and valuational
complex.
That Anyone’s search for truth elevates the species and
initiates a beneficial understanding of nature and human na-
ture also had, for Mill, more proximate consequences. “Gov-
ernment and civil society are the most complicated of all
subjects accessible to the human mind,” Mill (1963:319)
opined, but the self-conscious, meditative temper to which
an appreciation of natural and human science leads means
that the modern mind is better equipped—more complex,
more manifold—even than those of the ancients, of classical
Greece and Rome, to tackle these complications and depths.
Faced with sophistry in public life, for instance, we learn, as
Hobbes’s dictum has it, that “while words are the counters
of wise men, they are the money only of fools” (Mill 1963:
322). That is, we do not mistake words for the facts they stand
for; words themselves are not facts. Likewise, faced with su-
perstition and nescience, we appreciate, as Henry Maine re-
vealed, that ancient laws and obsolete institutions and ideas
may still have a covert influence on modern life, and we can
beware how such a “mitigated barbarism” may lead us to
accept erroneous things as natural or necessary. Faced with
all illiberalism, we recall that “bad men need nothing more
to compass their ends than that good men should look on
and do nothing” (Mill 1963:349).
Mill’s hope is that the university-educated individual will
practice the public virtue not to allow bad to be done in his
or her name. The government of a liberal society is Anyone’s
responsibility, and the truths with which civil society is im-
bued are a public manifestation of what the individual has
found out for himself or herself. Civil society represents a
kind of intermediate space or stage between the individual
life and that of the species, and the same truths ideally pervade
across the spectrum. It is “in our freedom” that sophistry,
superstition, and illiberalism do not prevail.
Truth and Self
The existentialist phrasing “in our freedom” does not actually
appear in Mill’s text, but I am struck by the resonances be-
tween Mill’s lecture and C. P. Snow’s. Human beings can hope
and expect to gain access to the real. The progress of science
provides the best example of the kinds of truths to which
human beings can aspire. Moreover, knowing the nature of
things as they are is a public virtue, one to which civil insti-
tutions such as universities should devote themselves and one
in which students should immerse themselves: we can and
should improve the human condition, and it is in this im-
provement that our dignity, our dignifying of human life,
resides.
This civilitude and humanism operate at both a societal
level and an individual level. Indeed, it is individually sourced.
By being true to oneself, true with oneself, one can hope
magnanimously to open up a liberal space for others; by being
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true to methods of truth and the discernment of truth, one
can hope to avoid sophistry and superstition in one’s own
life and also avoid an illiberal treatment of others. From the
authentic selfhood of the individual is to be derived an au-
thentic liberality or openness toward others and the world.
In our freedom as individual human beings—rational and
moral—we can accede to truths befitting the dignity of the
species.
It is remarkable the frisson I feel, the sense of discomfort
even, writing the above phrases and anticipating their (an-
tihumanistic) reception. How difficult it becomes to write
“truth,” “the nature of the human,” “individuality,” “indi-
vidual and human improvement” in an anthropological essay.
I also find that difficulty sad and alienating because these are
objectives that I believe are there to be addressed—the truth
about the individual and the human whole—and to which I
would lay disciplinary claim. Apprehending these things is
fundamental to the way in which anthropology may serve the
public value of charting ways to cosmopolitan justice: to a
liberal treatment of Anyone globally. The relation between
anthropology, truth and just global society is what I devote
the remainder of this article to illuminating.
Magnanimity and Toleration, Opinion
and Truth
I begin by returning to a distinction that Snow found sig-
nificant between “magnanimity” and “tolerance.” Magnanim-
ity began with being honest in one’s perceptions of self and
other and then in promoting the best in oneself and the other.
Knowledge would seem key here, both self-knowledge and
that of proximate and general others. One looks askance at
the status quo—ironically, critically, truthfully—in order to
see what is actually there and how it might be bettered. Tol-
erance, however, might be said to begin, and to end also, in
a certain distance. One does not presume to know the other
because one accords difference an a priori moral status in its
own right, a difference one need not and should not seek to
overcome. My understanding of Snow’s emphasis on mag-
nanimity is that it is based in an aspiration toward a true
knowledge of other as of self rather than simply a toleration
of an imagined difference. There was a global knowledge of
individuality to which humanity might aspire, and a civil
society could be envisaged in which such knowledge was a
common treasury. Being open to truth and endeavoring al-
ways to be discriminatory in ascertaining true knowledge and
to subject claims to the court of scientific criticism were the
processes by which the life of individual human beings and
the species whole were dignified and elevated alike.
In 1838 and 1840, Mill published a pair of essays that
amounted to praise poems, the first to philosopher and social
reformer Jeremy Bentham and the second to poet and critic
Samuel Taylor Coleridge. They were an odd pairing, the first
as liberal, secular, and “enlightened” as the second was con-
servative, religious, and “romantic” (Leavis 1950). But this,
for Mill, was the point: each was the opposite but also the
completing counterpart to the other. Bentham versus Cole-
ridge replayed John Locke versus the ancien re´gime that re-
played Aristotle versus Plato. Mill might have felt that Ben-
tham (Locke and Aristotle) possessed the truth and that
Bentham’s insistently doubting spirit and his detailed sifting
and anatomizing method were vital for a world where so many
false things were believed. But Mill also recognized that insofar
as rationalism came to be translated into a political program,
as in the French Revolution, a missing romantic element re-
moved the possibility of a complete settled polity. Coleridgean
conservatism—insisting on a restraining discipline, a feeling
of history and loyalty and the sacrosanct, with a value placed
on cohesion, sympathy, and common interest—included what
les philosophes overlooked as requisites of civil society in their
postrevolutionary designs; one might keep ancient forms even
as old contents were replaced with modern insights. Moreover,
given the ever-imperfect state of contemporary knowledge,
antagonism in political opinion was as important as were
mutually checking powers in the liberal constitution. Mill
concludes:
Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a
question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that
very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to
make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and
it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between
combatants fighting under hostile banners. (Mill 1963:172)
The above passage appears actually in the essay “On Lib-
erty” of 1859, and it was here that Mill famously developed
his mature insights concerning the individuality of opinion
properly admitted into a liberal society. “On Liberty”
amounted to a treatise on the relationship between opinion
on one side and orthodoxy, norm, and law on another, also
between opinion on the one hand and knowledge, fact, and
truth on the other. Opinion was contrastive by nature, Mill
asserted, and opposing opinions were necessary for a vital,
free, and progressing society. However, opinion also graded
into true knowledge: diversity and contrast were part of a
process that culminated in the truth. By turning now to “On
Liberty” more fully, I would elaborate on how Mill answers
the fundamental question of how one might move beyond
toleration in a practicing of magnanimity. As “opinion” grades
into “knowledge,” I would contend, so “culture” grades into
“civilization” and local community, or polis, into global so-
ciety, or cosmos. Difference becomes a step along the way to the
recognition of universal human truth.
“On Liberty” defends individuality against what Mill (1963:
194) describes as “the despotism of custom.” Human nature
is individual in nature, Mill begins. Human nature is not like
a machine that is or can be built after a model but more like
“a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides,
according to the tendency of the inward forces which make
it a living thing” (Mill 1963:184). It is the case that different
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human beings require different conditions for their devel-
opment, both physical and moral:
Such are the differences among human beings in their
sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the
operation on them of different physical and moral agencies,
that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes
of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor
grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which
their nature is capable. (Mill 1963:192)
It is best when the individual practices “his own mode of
laying out his existence, not because it is the best in itself,
but because it is his own mode” (Mill 1963:192); it is by
cultivating all that is individual in themselves that human
beings become “a noble and beautiful object of contempla-
tion” (Mill 1963:187).
Individuality was for Mill (1963:181) not only a “leading
essential for well being” but also a “necessary part and con-
dition” of “all that is designated by the terms civilization,
instruction, education.” Freedom of worldview or opinion
and freedom (within certain limits) to act on that opinion
were fundamental aspects of that individuality in practice. To
use and interpret experience in his or her own way was the
“proper condition of a human being” who was in mature
command of his or her faculties. Tradition and custom may
evidence what others’ experience had taught them, but this
experience may be narrow or old or unsuitable for the in-
dividual’s own nature or circumstance. To be best and most
fully human was for the individual to arrive at his or her own
life plan or life project: truth had to be personally discerned,
chosen, and lived so that all the faculties were employed and
not merely the imitative. The individual used “observation to
see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, activity to gather
materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and . . . firm-
ness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision” (Mill
1963:183).
The benefit of this to the species, to the progress of human
civilization, was the creation, experimentation, or discovery
of wise, good, and noble things: “a greater fullness of life” in
the individual brought about “more in the mass which is
composed of them” (Mill 1963:187). Sadly, however, it was
also the case that the despotism of custom often crushed
individuality and so hindered human advancement: “Custom
is there, in all things, the final appeal; justice and right mean
conformity to custom” (Mill 1963:195). It was Mill’s judg-
ment that England represented less of a threat to liberty in
this respect than “the East,” but even here individuals were
wont to lose themselves through pressures on and opportu-
nities for a collective uniformity. Instead of cultivating their
individuality and bringing themselves nearer to “the best
things they can be” (Mill 1963:188), mediocrity, weak ener-
gies, and weak feelings prevailed.
Let me look in somewhat more detail at this issue: how
and why individual differences in opinion should be admitted
into the public realm and how society developed in truth-
fulness as a result. Mill sums up his case as follows:
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion
is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the
existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion,
still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right,
they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error
for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a
benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth, produced by its collision with error. (Mill 1963:142)
Individuals are not infallible, as we have heard, and “ages,”
as sums of individuals, are no less so. It is therefore wrong
to compel an opinion to ignominy or silence, because it may
be wholly or partially true. The nature of truth is that it is
complex, and to intend to know the whole of a subject, it is
necessary to hear what can be said of it by people of all
experiences and how it might be approached by people of all
characters. For these reasons of fallibility and complexity, ev-
ery truth-claim must be pushed to an extreme: reasoning must
be valid for the extreme case if it is to be good for any case.
Also, truth-claims must be continually proven, with every
opportunity taken to refute them, to avoid the dead hand of
habit. Truth, in short, is an attitude as well as a possession:
to be properly appreciated it must continually represent a real
and heartfelt conviction reached by reason and personal ex-
perience and not a mere formal profession or prejudice (“pre-
judgement”). Truth is a difficult and continuous work. Nor
are fallibility, complexity, and habituality the only difficulties
to be overcome. One sidedness continues to be a commonplace
in human practice, Mill observes—the recourse to partial
judgments—as well as sectarianism, whereby truth is rejected
or not recognized because it is propagated by persons regarded
as opponents. Thus may the partial truths of collective tra-
dition harden into contrarian exaggeration, bigotry, and prej-
udice.
It is nevertheless the case, Mill is happy to conclude, that
on the calmer and more disinterested bystander even if not
on the more impassioned partisan, a collision of diverse opin-
ions works a salutary effect. False surmises and practices grad-
ually yield to fact and argument. Humankind does progress,
becoming more capable of discerning the truth in all its dif-
ficulty and complexity; difference of opinion consolidates into
unity, and history assumes a certain shape:
As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are
no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the
increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be
measured by the number and gravity of the truths which
have reached the point of being uncontested. (Mill 1963:
168)
A narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is inevitable
and indispensable, Mill attests, even though a civil society
must continue to employ “contrivances” (such as Socratic
dialectics) that ensure that truth remains a live issue (for the
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maturing and the matured alike) and never simply customary
or doctrinal.
The Conditions of Debate
Key to Mill’s notion of civil advance is the understanding
that the free expression of a diversity of opinions will result
not only in an initial collision but also in an eventual con-
solidation as truth. Certain conditions must be met, however,
for this to occur. For those “backward states of society in
which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage,” Mill
admits (1963:136), free and equal discussion is unlikely to
convince or persuade. “The greater part of the world,” he
considers, “has, properly speaking, no history, because the
despotism of Custom is complete” (Mill 1963:195); over “the
whole East,” the capacity to guide oneself through deliberation
to one’s own improvement has not yet evolved. (Mill’s words
are resonant of what will be Max Weber’s thesis concerning
the ubiquity of “traditional” authority and its necessary evo-
lution to “rational.”)
But it has become hard to apply such terms and conditions,
so to speak. Mill’s language is open to easy caricature as
teleological, also ethnocentric and “orientalist”: it is no longer
feasible, politically or even intellectually, to dichotomize and
evaluate as he would. In a globalized circumstance, with “the
East” coming west, the “backward” is more likely nominated
to be the member of the “developing world,” the “postco-
lonial” or “subaltern.” An expectation of custom evolving into
civilitude is more often replaced by an assertion of a cultural
right to adhere to a traditionalist orientation, made in the
name of a collective deemed to be an organic unit of ho-
mogeneous membership and inheritance. There exists a kind
of cultural fundamentalism, both within the academy and
without, embodying a neoromantic “authochthonization”
(Malkki 1995:52) in contrast to notions of “enlightened” pro-
gress. “Cultures are not options,” Bhikhu Parekh (1998:212)
presumptively legislates, and the “survivance” of cultural tra-
dition (Taylor 1992:54) is to be deemed a collective goal and
a right that takes legitimate precedence over individual desires.
According to this culturalist discourse, cultural belonging is
to humanity as species belonging is to animality (Stoczkowski
2009:11). Here is knowledge canonized as culturally limited
(Evans-Pritchard 1937), here is cultural difference as deserv-
ing of the most fundamental respect (American Anthropo-
logical Association 1947), and here is cultural belonging as
fundamentally mediating identity (Runnymede Trust 2000).
In short, Mill’s terms and conditions of liberal progress are
replaced by ones of fundamental communitarian difference.
Cultural communities assume the right to deploy matrices of
symbolic classifications that define the individual human be-
ing’s essence: as member or outsider, “infidel” or “apostate,”
“Quebecois” and “First Nation,” as “modest woman” on
“Muslim land.” The “culture defence” (Demian 2008) antic-
ipates the reproduction of sovereign communities, encultur-
ated memberships, and discrete traditions, perspectives and
practices in multicultural spaces. Culturalism, in Unni Wi-
kan’s (1999) synopsis, is “loose on the streets.”
It would not be true to say that the idea of consolidating
opinion into truth—and transcending customary cultures—
has become a wholly foreign project since Mill. C. P. Snow’s
vision of magnanimity—including the existential freedom to
move forward with an honest and generous appraisal of peo-
ple and things—finds its place in a twentieth-century liberal
tradition that can boast E. M. Forster’s embrace of civil lib-
erties, Karl Popper’s “open society,” Isaiah Berlin’s “negative
freedom,” John Rawls’s theory of justice, Brian Barry’s cri-
tique of multiculturalism, and extending to Richard Rorty’s
“postmodern bourgeois liberalism.” Ju¨rgen Habermas’s “dis-
course ethics” discerns a specific relationship between civil
exchange and truth, claiming a communicative rationality
whose consequences are moral.
Similarly, it is not true that since Mill there have not been
versions of liberal propositions within anthropology. Ernest
Gellner forthrightly insisted on the dichotomization between
culture and science, between custom and truth:
A collectivity united in a belief is a culture. That is what
the term means. More particularly, a collectivity united in
a false belief is a culture. Truths, especially demonstrable
truths, are available to all and sundry, and do not define
any continuity of faith. But errors, especially dramatic er-
rors, are culture specific. They do tend to be the badges of
community and loyalty. Assent to an absurdity is an intel-
lectual rite de passage, a gateway to the community defined
by that commitment to that conviction. (Gellner 1995:6)
Wikan (1999:57–58), again, decries a culturalism that has
“run astray,” such that to say “this is my culture” is to lay
claim not to a personal becoming but to a particular and
exclusive collective nature, fixed and uniform, demanding of
respect, even reverence. Wikan’s conclusion is that culture is
neither a fitting frame for the organization of social relations
nor a fitting foundation of an anthropological science. It now
behooves anthropology to speak against a notion of culture
as a foundational difference and speak for sameness: the same-
ness of the human and the sameness of the individual human
being (Wikan 1999:63). Honor the integrity and agency of
Anyone.
In previous writings of my own I have wanted, too, to
address the totalizing, even totalitarian, tendencies of com-
munities as containers of identity and matrices of meaning
(Amit and Rapport 2002), and I have urged that anthropology
beware conflating the cultural symbolization and classification
of the world with its truth. There is a gulf between cultural
constructions of personhood, most importantly, and the ob-
jective lineaments of individual embodiment and identity
(Rapport 1997, 2010a). Even should individualism be deemed
a particular historico-cultural symbolization of group mem-
bership, it need not be confused with individuality—the con-
sciousness, intentionality, agency, distinct embodiment, and
subjectivity of the human actor—which can be considered as
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a universal fact of the human condition (Rapport 2003). It
is human nature to exist beyond culturo-historical specifics
and givens, both temperamentally, as in manifestations of
individual scepticism and irony, and cognitively, in manifes-
tations of individual criticism, rationality and imagination
(Rapport 2010b). This is Anyone’s existential freedom.
The sticking point is the political. Science delivers objective
propositions that are in principle translatable, without loss of
efficacy, into any cultural milieu, Gellner (1993:58) observed.
By “science” I would understand a rationalist engagement
with the world that includes the deliverances of human science
(such as anthropology). “Gender is a construct” is a fact. The
individuality of consciousness is a fact. The nonevidential
“leap of faith” implicated in confessional identities is a fact.
“Human history is characterized by a traffic in meanings be-
tween cultural areas without stable or fixed borders” is a fact.
In principle, as Gellner (1993:58) suggests, one can imagine
knowledge of such scientific fact spreading universally, incre-
mentally replacing the particularistic and contingent and
mythopoetic and laying the foundations of a new social order:
new knowledge and new society existing beyond cultural and
communitarian difference. But this is not the nature of Re-
alpolitik and ressentiment. To expect Western Enlightenment
notions, whether of rationality or liberality, to be met and
embraced as abstract ideas, as ideas alone, as ideas at all, is
to fail to understand the politics of culture and the continuing
commitment to its “false” and “absurd” convictions (Gellner
1995). Identity politics mean that deliverances of the Enlight-
enment operate as global phenomena, where and when they
do, through the market and through the industrial-military
complex more than through an idealistic (or existentially
“free”) appreciation, an open or progressive acceptance of
change to traditional matrices of social structuration and be-
lief.
On one view, it will be ever thus. Cultural belonging is an
intrinsically contrastive, agonistic, political phenomenon, as
James Boon (1982:231) describes it: one intends not a pro-
gressive going beyond so much as a “playing the vis-a`-vis.”
However fuzzy and contingent, heterogeneous, incoherent,
formalistic, and superficial may be the actual contents of cul-
tural tradition, “cultures” can yet be recognized as essentially
“beside themselves” (Boon 1982:230); constituted contras-
tively, both as wholes and as parts, they incline toward oth-
erness in a dialectical fashion. The cultural ever “emerges as
a contrastive replaceable for its complement”: cultural
traditions can be expected to exaggerate and invent otherness,
indeed, so as to continue to be themselves (Boon 1982:213).
Culture embodies an implicit negativity.
If this is the nature of cultural politics and a global world
is also a world of growing political “compression” (Paine
1992)—of cultural boundaries piling up against one another
in incremental fashion—then is it still viable to hope for
opinion to grade into knowledge and for “culture” to give
way to “civilization”? Is toleration of difference, as against its
magnanimous overcoming, the furthest moral hope? It is not
hard to find commentary that would suggest that liberalism
is passe´; hopes that humanity might unite in a universal civ-
ilization grounded in notions of human and individual same-
ness are eclipsed by a politics of histories and communities
where members assert themselves as peoples and not as es-
sential rights-bearing persons. A political context dominated
by renascent particularisms, militant religions, and resurgent
ethnicities, it is said, spells the collapse of any Enlightenment
project on a world-historical scale (Gray 1992).
The Gradation of Layered Worlds
The Holiday was one of three novels written by the English
poet Stevie Smith. Set in 1949, it centrally concerns Celia,
living in a London suburb with an aunt and working as a
civil servant at a government ministry. Celia describes the
setting of her life as “postwar”: an abiding sense of time that
is neither war nor peace: a place where people work long
hours, do nothing compared with the victory others have
secured, and feel guilty and exasperated. Celia is “caught in
the bewilderment of a postwar consequence, the trivial, the
boring, the necessary, the inescapable; what is one’s duty”
(Smith 2007:184).
Celia ponders family life, personal loves, suffering and
death, but her (and Smith’s) meditations also concern global
politics, in particular the relation between England and its
erstwhile empire. “A great Power in the full flush of the
greatest victory that men have won”—for every blow Ger-
many inflicted on Jewry and its other victims, England gave
them death “to three times three”—now finds itself exhausted
(Smith 2007:89, 129). The postwar gives a sense of being
trapped in a web of sophistry. England (the West) feels weak
and corrupt, no longer single-minded and simple, noble, or
admirable.
Celia is torn. On the one hand, she knows herself to be a
middle-class English girl, proud and complacent about a dear
country: “I have no integrity, no honesty, no generous idea
of a better way of life than that which gives cream to England”
(Smith 2007:92). This Celia feels bitter about the pressure on
England to quit India, Palestine, Malaya, the Antarctic, and
South Africa just because the rest of the world wants a change,
pointing a none-too-clean forefinger at a path to sainthood
it expects England (alone) to follow.
A cousin of Celia’s, in uniform in Palestine, was once beaten
by “Jewish Zionist terrorists”: they wanted this British officer,
with long centuries of government behind him and enjoying
the top prestige, to understand the perspective of the lowest
and the landless. But Celia’s cousin had refused them the
magnanimous gesture, wrapping himself up instead in his
anger, pomposity, and sense of indignation.
But Celia knows, too, that her cousin’s response is not
sufficient. A vision of a new world is called for, which the
English will morally deliver: they will leave Palestine and leave
India, out of choice and for the sake of conscience. And Celia’s
hope is that the Indians and the Zionists, in their anger and
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their pride, will then “see” the English—understand the other
perspective—in ways her cousin the army officer would not.
Celia’s hope for English rectitude on the world stage is
drawn from a key component of Englishness: its law. Here is
something that she considers to be “above the world”: “not
to be bought, it is strong, flexible and impartial” (Smith 2007:
126). This institutional hope is consolidated by a more per-
sonal knowledge: the example of her Indian friend in London,
Raji. What is wonderful to Celia about Raji is his generosity
and his freedom. His upbringing was oppressive; he was in-
terned in an English prison camp in India and also beaten
by the Indian police as an agitator. Notwithstanding, he de-
ploys his intelligence and his warmheartedness to see people
for what they are: seeing beyond the English creation of a
vassal state; beyond the Hindu widow burning, child rape,
and caste; beyond the cruelty and avarice of Muslim brokers.
Raji exists as “an honest person upon a centre fixed” (Smith
2007:13).
Smith’s language is no more politically correct toward oth-
erness, always, than is Mill’s (“backward, barbarian states of
society”) or Gellner’s (“absurd to pretend all meaning-systems
are equal”). My interest is in interrogating whether it might
be said to be liberal with cultural difference. (The Holiday
appears as an imprint in the Virago series “Modern Classics”:
the reader is invited to find in the text a classic “human”
voice with which to engage.)
I am struck by several resonances with C. P. Snow’s key
terms: “honest,” “generous,” and, in particular, “free.” Raji is
heroic in his freedom, in looking out on the world from an
authentic center in the self with a capacity to be honest re-
garding what he sees, and generous in his practices. Resonant
also with Mill is the value of an impartial law that is above
the sway of opinion, of the merely local and customary, and
that is flexible enough to treat the individual case universally.
This is worth “speaking up for” (Smith 2007:141) and “stand-
ing up for” (Mill 1963:217). Celia lives at a particular time
and place and possesses particular perspectives on the world.
And yet she, as a character, and Stevie Smith, as her creator,
would claim an existence beyond the limits of such partic-
ularities. One does get beyond “English” and “Indian,” “post-
war” and “Palestine,” and “Zionist terrorist” to a knowledge
of what is “above the world” of narrow identity and difference.
A further allusion concerns the layering of human life.
Celia’s middle-class English opinions—and those of the In-
dian Hindus and Muslims she hears about from Raji and
those of the Zionists she learns of from her cousin—these are
kinds of subjectivity or partiality that exist beneath her rec-
ognition of the need for a new world to be reached through
a more objective honesty and magnanimity, also beneath her
appreciation of a rule of law that might be lodged above the
mundane world. From opinion to knowledge, from particular
to general, and from polis to cosmos can be conceived of here,
I would say, as kinds of movement between layers of the
human condition existing simultaneously as well as over time.
It was this kind of vision that Karl Popper (1978) promoted
in his depiction of an open liberal society. He posited “three
worlds” of contemporaneous human habitation: “World 1”
being that of the physical object, “World 2” that of subjective
experience, and “World 3” of objective knowledge. Albeit that
these interpenetrated contemporaneously, they also repre-
sented evolutionary stages in a human cosmos.
To elaborate in brief, the scientific tradition is distinguished
from the prescientific tradition and the nonscientific, Popper
(1963:50) asserts, in being internally layered. Like these latter,
science is a tradition that is passed on; and also like the latter,
scientific theory is interested, possessing a partiality that can
but influence the observations and the practices conducted
in its name (because observations are always theory impreg-
nated). However, unlike prescience and nonscience, scientific
tradition is founded on critique. Theory and practice are
passed on not as dogma but with the challenge continually
present to debate them and improve on them. Science ascends
to objectivity, then—even while beginning in subjectivity—
by way of open discussion, free criticism, and unlimited com-
petition (Popper 1997:69). Science accedes to better knowl-
edge than nonscience because of its practice of rational crit-
icism (dogmatism and orthodoxy ever represent the death of
knowledge and its development). The layering within science
is an echo of the layering between science and nonscience.
One nevertheless admits, Popper continues, that there ex-
ists no general criterion of scientific truth that can save us
from error. We can continue to err in our judgements and
miss the truth because we are fallible human beings; science
is not infallible or finally authoritative because it is a human
methodology. But this is not to say that the choice between
competing theories is arbitrary; we do learn and we can get
nearer to the truth. The quest for certainty may be a mistaken
one but not the quest for truthfulness. Again, the secret lies
in critique: if we endeavor continually to criticize our theories,
we can learn that we have been mistaken—and so get nearer
to the truth. We may call this a theory of fallibilistic absolutism
(Popper 1980:374–378): one may not know with certainty
what is true, but one knows what is not true. Human beings
can recognize the absoluteness of their errors.
One also recognizes the hopelessness of seeking precision
in words or concepts. It is impossible to speak in a way that
renders it impossible for one to be misunderstood. Never-
theless, it is feasible to expect to deploy symbols in a sufficiently
precise way for the problem context in which they are in-
tended. It is similarly possible to see beyond symbolic lan-
guages to the real things and the real problems that they would
describe and that they would treat. We can escape both ver-
balistic involution and a nihilistic self-referentialism (Popper
1999:20–30). The secret, again, is openness and criticism. Ad-
mit every source of knowledge—imagination, tradition, rea-
son, observation—in every possible symbolic format but grant
none final authority as a guarantee or criterion of truth ex-
empt from practical critique.
And so Popper comes to his positing of a potential tripartite
layering of worlds of human habitation. In World 1, human
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beings exist amid physical things, as natural organisms. In
World 2, human existence is characterized by subjective, imag-
inary, phenomenal, somatic, mythopoetic experience and by
customary behavior. In World 3, human existence benefits
from critical externalizations of mind, from the production
of objective knowledge lodged in a variety of symbolizations:
languages, social institutions, works of art, pieces of tech-
nology, scientific treatises, novels. The physical, the experi-
ential, the critical; there is recursive interaction between these
three layers of human existence. But key to my purpose here
is Popper’s (1997:150) notion that objective scientific knowl-
edge be understood as ideal-typically an “exosomatic artefact”
that occupies World 3, as a culmination of movement from
Worlds 1 and 2. Knowledge is of a real world, subjectively
construed (opined), which is finally objectified through the
practices of open debate, practical experimentation, and rea-
soned critique. Knowledge exists beyond the individual body,
also beyond the body of community tradition and belief; it
is stored in libraries and in technologies, which are distinct
from knowing subjects. The evolution from things to opinions
to knowledge is a gradation possibly above the world of the
individual life project and lifetime, also of the communitarian.
As Popper’s liberal vision of knowledge production be-
comes impersonal and utilitarian, there is a temptation to lose
trust: abstraction can tend toward authoritarianism, and
openness can appear as an impatience with or disrespect for
proximate constraints (cf. Rapport 2005). But I recall how
Mill also lodged his concern with freedom of individual opin-
ion finally in the whole human species moving forward in
truth, while Popper (1997:80) insists that it is in increasing
individual freedom and relieving personal suffering that the
worth of human science and endeavor is ultimately lodged.
Popper, like Mill, refuses to eschew the link between particular
and general: it is through human advancement that individual
security is vouchsafed. It is not personalism that one decries
but relativism: all humanity has the capacity and the right to
operate in, and to benefit from, all three worlds. This is our
dignity. One does not hold fundamentalistically to a particular
tradition however much one enjoys the experience of com-
munity belonging; rather, one anticipates acceding to knowl-
edge beyond opinion, critiquing any essentialist claims to in-
traspecies difference. With “effort” and “good will,” Popper
concludes (1997:34), far-reaching understanding of the world
and of one another, even if not perfect, is achievable.
Envoi: Issues of Overcoming Difference
Anthropology, in Kant’s (1996 [1798]) formulation, was to
be at once an empirical, pragmatic, and ethical enquiry ul-
timately responsible for delivering a cosmopolitan improve-
ment in knowledge and justice. My efforts in this article might
be said scarcely to have departed from an idealist domain of
novel, philosophical treatise, and social-cum-moral commen-
tary; the intent, however, remains practical. How can one
formulate an anthropological approach to difference that
reaches beyond the identification of customary opinion and
communitarian exclusivity and their political posturing to
secure true knowledge and its free individual enjoyment on
a global scale? And my focus remains empirical: the daily
context in which human individual capacities for freely au-
thoring identities—including those existentialist proclivities
for revaluation, transcendence, irony, voluntarism, and be-
coming—are threatened by culturalist discourses champi-
oning essentialist classifications and communitarian closure.
A cosmopolitan perspective on this causes me to cherish pro-
gress in the human accumulation of objective knowledge and
progress in the freedoms universally guaranteed Anyone for
fulfilling individual worldviews and life projects.
I end by addressing speculatively three further questions
to which these considerations lead me. First, regarding what
kind of datum might opinion best be expected to consolidate
into knowledge? It is perhaps the case that “opinion” should
itself be regarded as internally differentiated or layered, that
some kinds of opinion are more easily converted into fact
than others, and that one works one’s way across the spectrum
from easy to difficult. “The earth is flat,” “The earth is 4004
years old,” “The Holocaust did not occur,” “There is a global
Zionist conspiracy,” “AIDS is a divine punishment,” “Life
begins at conception,” “Women are intrinsically more modest
than men,” “Sadomasochism should be countenanced be-
tween consenting adults,” “Stanley Spencer is the greatest Brit-
ish twentieth-century painter,” “The Holiday is a classic of
modern literature,” “Coca-Cola tastes better than Pepsi.” It
might be argued that the above statements traverse a spectrum
from the more easily refuted (as false knowledge) to the less
easily, culminating in kinds of opinion that might ever remain
matters of taste. While much may reside in gray areas—to
which communitarian loyalties may continue to attach them-
selves—it is nevertheless significant to recognize rational pro-
cedures as existing above the cultural sway.
Second, in what kind of social situation might opinion best
be expected to consolidate into knowledge? The politicization
of culture renders opinion a matter of honor and pride, while
stereotypes have long proved themselves resistant to being
overturned by fact (Rapport 1995). There is resistance to
knowledge that is introduced by opponents and strangers and
a seeming preference (as Gellner observed) for native error;
there is resistance to unilateral or charitable acts of knowledge
provision and a preference for the “honor” of error one has
oneself determined or inherited. One might conclude that to
be open to change calls for a level of social affluence and
confidence. But then again, there is deemed to be nausea and
an anxiety associated with “postmodern excess” that renders
us unconfident as a global condition (Bauman 1998:72–75).
Our general situation is one where cultural fundamentalism
promises an escape from individual responsibility via an em-
bracing of personal insufficiency vis-a`-vis the collective. The
issue is to find nontotalitarian responses to the “risks” of
personal freedom.
Third, for what kind of temperament might opinion best be
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expected to consolidate into knowledge? Openness and confi-
dence as social ethos must also find a counterpart in indi-
vidual attitude and temperament. There must be a willingness
to learn and improve for opinion to grade into knowledge.
One feels confident, perhaps, that one may change and still
remain oneself. In describing knowledge as “exosomatic” and
social, Popper seemed to suggest that individuals change their
opinions less than societies do; to see opinion grade into
knowledge calls for a historical perspective. And yet, the dig-
nity I would accord to Anyone, the liberal hope to be cherished
for the life of any human individual, presumes a capacity for
truth and a desire to fit oneself with the best knowledge
available that is universal. To exchange opinion for knowledge
is necessary for us to make the best of ourselves and our
fellows in the present.
Comments
Vered Amit
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Concordia
University, 1455 de Maisonneuve Boulevard West, Mon-
treal, Quebec H3G 1M8, Canada (vamit@alcor.concordia
.ca). 7 V 11
The scope of the research questions posed by scholars, an-
thropologists included, has probably never been as open or
innovative as the ideal of “pure” and unfettered academic
inquiry might suggest. The chances that our inquiries would
be shaped, more or less, by the passing seductions of academic
fashions or the pressures of dominant disciplinary and insti-
tutional orthodoxies have always been high. But at a time in
which many institutions of higher education and research are
experiencing increasing corporatization, the pressure to cede
the span of research questions to “strategic” initiatives, brand-
ing exercises, government-set priorities, and so on is all the
more inexorable. Hence, one cannot but admire Rapport’s
willingness to court questions and adopt stances that have
become controversial in anthropology (and related disciplines
and policy positions). That many of these questions are rooted
in a venerable Enlightenment tradition makes Rapport’s sense
that using certain kinds of phrases (“truth,” “the nature of
the human,” “individuality,” “individual and human im-
provement”) in an anthropological essay has become very
difficult, ironic rather than irrelevant. In an effort to establish
credentials for innovation, anthropologists have a tendency
to eat their elders. Hence, simply positing that certain intel-
lectuals and ideas of the past might still be inspiring for the
present can become controversial. In doing so, we may bur-
nish our claims for novelty, but we also risk undercutting the
richness of the disciplinary traditions on which we can draw.
But if we regard anthropology first and foremost as a mode
of inquiry, or, as Rapport would have it, a “human science,”
then surely its progress must be judged in terms of the ef-
fectiveness of the research questions that anthropologists pose.
Is the search for a moral position on the relationship between
anthropology, truth, and just global society the best way to
open up new avenues for empirical anthropological inquiry?
In 1995, in an earlier debate published by Current An-
thropology, Roy D’Andrade (1995) responded to a series of
attacks in anthropology on objectivity, science, the notion of
truth, generalizations, ethnography, and anthropology by ar-
guing that the effort of these internal critiques was to propose
the transformation of anthropology from “a discipline based
upon an objective model of the world to a discipline based
upon a moral model of the world” (399, emphasis in the
original). “Objectivity” D’Andrade (1995) defined as referring
to the “degree to which an account gives information about
the object being described” (399–400). To the extent that the
account describes a thing rather than oneself, it stands a rea-
sonable chance of being replicable or refutable. In contrast,
a moral model seeks to ascribe judgments about good and
bad or assign blame and praise. D’Andrade (1995) made it
clear that he was not arguing that anthropologists should have
no moral models; rather, he was arguing that they should
keep their moral passions or politics separate from how they
“do their science” (402). Moral models may be useful for
arguing about what use is made of our findings, but they are
“counterproductive for discovering how the world works”
(D’Andrade 1995).
I would add that they are also counterproductive because
they are not very effective at opening up fields of inquiry. We
can judge the analytical effectiveness of theoretical paradigms
in terms of their capacity for generating the kinds of questions
that open up new avenues for inquiry. To the extent that by
their very nature, moral models seek to provide answers or
positions on how the world should work, they are not very
good for generating questions about how it does work. Rap-
port argues that his intent remains practical and empirical.
But it also blends objective and moral models. Rapport thus
seeks progress in the accumulation of knowledge but also
“progress in the freedoms universally guaranteed Anyone for
fulfilling individual worldviews and life projects.” But this, it
would appear, seeks to morally resolve the question of in-
dividuality rather than to pose it in ways we might fruitfully
investigate. As such, it may be an important and emotive
subject for moral debate, but it seems more likely to close off
rather than open up avenues for empirical investigation.
Michał Buchowski
Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology,
Adam Mickiewicz University, ul. S´w. Marcin 78, 61-809
Poznan´, Poland (mbuch@amu.edu.pl). 8 V 11
In this stimulating text I find three important and interrelated
issues that are interesting in view of the long-existing disputes
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in anthropology. In a sense, it is a continuation and revital-
ization of the “old” topics broadly related to the issue of
particularism versus universalism.
1. Rationalism. Among other things, Nigel Rapport says
that rational cognition is probably a major driving force be-
hind neohumanism, in which Anyone can fulfill his or her
individuality in a cosmopolitan world and in a liberal fashion.
The controversy between rationalism and relativism kept busy
many in anthropology and philosophy some decades ago (Pe-
ter Winch, Steven Lukes, Martin Hollis, Ian Jarvie, Joseph
Agassi, John Beattie, Mary Hesse, Dan Sperber, etc.). In a
spirit of zero tolerance in the intellectual domain, Rapport
urges us to turn opinion into knowledge not by setting “ob-
jective standards” but by applying liberal principles facilitating
constant advancement of learning, which enables the liber-
ation of individuals from “habit and custom” and the attain-
ment of “magnanimity,” which is something more than the
toleration of otherness. I cannot agree more. It should be
added that although such an attitude can be derived from
John S. Mill and later from C. P. Snow, Karl Popper, and
Ernest Gellner, it has had many other advocates, such as Allan
Hanson, Ian Hacking, Robin Horton, Jon Elster, or Phillipe
Mongin, who by reaching to intellectual traditions other than
liberal developed a more benign as well as less Western/sci-
ence-centric understanding of “rationality,” meaning pursu-
ing “truth” in the domain of cognition and making rational
choices in everyday life. I dared to call it “rationality relativ-
ized,” that is, the consistency of actions with regard to shared
and available convictions (Buchowski 1997:40). Assiduous in
our cosmopolitan striving for the best knowledge but never
assuming its objectivity, we make the best choices from ex-
isting options that are unavoidably moral and utterly hu-
manistic. Richard Rorty (1991:198–199) associates this atti-
tude with “modern-Western-liberals.” Rapport need not
convince those convinced about the rational and moral
choices humans have to make in the name of goodness and
“truth.” Moreover, it could be done without recourse to an
idealistic and mysterious human nature and, at the same time,
without the ignorance of mundane pragmatics, that is, culture
and power relations.
2. Culture. Elaborated by British gentlemen, individualism
and liberalism also assist a move from a group-bound culture
to a universal civilization in which individuals can fulfill their
aspirations and desires. This is also a point prompting a cri-
tique of multiculturalism as a philosophy and social policy.
Rapport mentions Uni Wikan’s writings supporting this
stance; however, he neglects to acknowledge many other an-
thropologists who, in this respect and for various reasons,
questioned the concept long before (e.g., Tim Ingold, Ulf
Hannerz, James Clifford) or even wrote “against culture”
(Abu-Lughod 1991:137–138). Most of these authors perceive
“culture” as an abused, reified, and essentialized notion and
tend to see it in Foucauldian terms of discursive practices,
not necessarily bounded to any “sociocultural unit.” Phe-
nomena conceptualized in such “classical” anthropological
“culturalist” terms as hybridization, transnationalism, and
globalization also provoke an intellectual response in the form
of Rapport’s cosmopolitanism, which becomes a part as well
as an epitome of these developments. The uniqueness of the
latter rests in the fact that it grounds itself in philosophic
liberal ideals such as human nature and individual freedom
and not in mundane affairs, social relations, and hierarchies.
3. Power. Rapport’s stand is permeated by humanist ideals
that anthropologists have shared anyhow. Already evolution-
ists promoted the psychic unity and rationality of all humans.
Moreover, even as experts in particular “cultures” and pro-
moters of relativism, they have struggled for the equality of
humans and for universal virtues. Relativism does not imply
cognitive tolerance, but in the form presented above it as-
sumes a constant rational striving for better forms of knowl-
edge and the rejection of irrational beliefs. The recognition
of different ways of life (cultures) and the promotion of the
plurality of lifestyles (multiculturalism) does not exclude what
Terrence Turner (1993) calls “critical multiculturalism.” The
idea of “social tolerance always” is Turner’s perspective ex-
plicitly tied with individuals’ right to choose a lifestyle and a
group as well as to change it at will. The value added in this
“traditional” anthropological way of study is that it does not
close its eyes to power relations contained in social life. Rap-
port’s project seems to be detached from issues of power
relations between individuals and groups (also those impli-
cating hierarchies of knowledge) and is limited to the domain
of philosophical rationale of some aspects of anthropological
practice.
Nigel Rapport has reminded us about the basics of an-
thropological craft that we often forget in the hectic academic
life and business. I appreciate it very much. I just wanted to
emphasize that similar ideas can be found other than in “lib-
eral cosmopolitan” intellectual traditions of the discipline,
that the black-and-white picture of universalism contrasted
with particularism cannot be easily drawn, and that drawing
it may actually simplify the picture.
Simon Coleman
Department and Centre for the Study of Religion, Univer-
sity of Toronto, Jackman Humanities Building, Room 333,
170 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario M5R 2M8, Canada
(simon.coleman@utoronto.ca). 11 V 11
The cosmopolitan, liberal anthropology that Rapport pro-
poses has its heroes and villains. Some forms of difference—
those seemingly produced by knee-jerk assertions of cultural
identity—are presented as productive of a sterile particular-
ism. But a questing, questioning marketplace of ideas is re-
garded as more generative, capable of progress and even unity
of opinion. So here we see a sociocultural anthropologist ac-
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tually searching for freedom from the parochialisms of cul-
tural entanglement and advocating for the emergence of an
“emancipated subject” (Keane 2007:5)—indeed, a subject that
can be called Anyone.
Rapport’s voicing of his argument is intriguing and pro-
vocative. In his text, Mill and Snow speak to the assembled
students at St. Andrews but also to each other, to Rapport,
to us, as if their arguments were ultimately as timeless as the
liberated subjectivity explored in the paper. Mind you, I do
note that while the message of these secular sermons is meant
to lead us toward open discussion, their medium—in this
context—is more that of the authoritative monologue, deliv-
ered in decidedly venerable surroundings, even if it also meant
to speak truth (or at least opinion) to university authorities.
Whether timeless or untimely, Rapport’s essay reminds us
eloquently and bravely of some important lessons. From him,
I hear that anthropology must think more subtly about a
critique of the uses of culture and in the process take on a
public, expansive perspective that it has often lacked or re-
jected in Western intellectual and political circles. In this sense,
the ability of both Mill and Snow to bridge professional worlds
is as eloquent as their words. And I agree that our arguments
can surely gain power through a search for and assertion of
human commonalities that extend beyond physical realms so
that we do not constantly fall back on delivering pious re-
minders (usually from the margins) to other disciplines of
the value of the particular and the idiosyncratic. Inherent in
these tasks is a question also posed by Kant (and largely absent
in Durkheim’s emphasis on the coercive moral power of the
collective [e.g., Laidlaw 2002:312]) relating to what the human
as “free” actor might be able to achieve and how we can
improve our self-knowledge both as individuals and as a spe-
cies (Hart 2010:441).
But I am still left with many questions. Is Rapport’s in-
dictment ultimately aimed at renascent particularisms and
ethnicities, at the anthropology that has become embroiled
in charting their asserted differences, or at both? More
broadly, should his proposal not contain some diagnosis of
why, in his terms, such sterile articulations of difference are
currently flourishing, or are we to ignore the social and po-
litical catalysts for the efflorescence of obstinate expressions
of parochial rather than cosmopolitan culture? For his ex-
emplars, Rapport turns to both fiction and natural science
(as did both Mill and Snow), but I wonder how well a Pop-
perian model of the search for truth can serve us as we attempt
to transcend communitarian closures. How does the effortful
rigor of scientific method provide a plausible paradigm for
the open exchange of ideas that is to be achieved at universal,
global levels? How will the evidence permitting Anyones to
create and test knowledge be distributed, and how are we to
decide when truth, however provisional, has been attained?
These are questions less about (the inevitability of) politics
in human affairs and more about the role of institutions in
the framing and authorizing of voices. We should after all
remember that Mill—himself the prodigious embodiment of
extraordinary educational efforts on behalf of his father—
championed liberty alongside legislation that would grant en-
hanced voting power to the well educated, including no doubt
the university students he was addressing at St. Andrews. Most
of us would agree that universities should not, alas, be taken
as ideal embodiments of the universal. I also worry about the
assumptions inherent in Gellner’s dictum: “Social tolerance
always; intellectual tolerance never.” This position, powerful
as it is in its defense of rationality, also assumes the presence
of interlocutors who are engaged as equals in a global field
of epistemological competition that can somehow take place
emancipated from the shackles of culture (Coleman 2008:44).
Finally, and perhaps displaying my own intellectual insular-
ities, I would like to know more about how Rapport’s pro-
posals can make me write a different kind of ethnography—
a discourse that looks both to the particular and to an an-
thropological vision of the universal. But I make these remarks
while confident that Rapport’s “meditation” on free discourse
is meant to produce just that: a dialogue where observations
on the power and parochialisms of “culture” should mark the
beginning, not the end, of the questions that we ask.
Alberto Corsı´n Jime´nez
Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales, Consejo Superior
de Investigaciones Cientı´ficas, Calle Albasanz 26–28, 28037
Madrid, Spain (alberto.corsin-jimenez@cchs.csic.es). 10 V
11
I am grateful for being given the opportunity to comment
on a piece by Nigel Rapport, whose graceful and finely argued
texts are always a pleasure to read. Rapport’s philosophically
minded voice is an unusual one in anthropology and has
enlarged the compass of our discipline’s theoretical possibil-
ities.
In this piece Rapport offers us an uncompromising call for
a liberal, magnanimous anthropology. He follows C. P. Snow’s
approach on magnanimity, where the term is used to describe
the human capacities for mutually enhancing our self- and
others’ existential freedom in our search for truth. Such ca-
pacity is a “practical virtue” that adds up to the well-being
of our “species whole.” It is a public good that we do to each
other, and it is sourced in the individual.
The individual foundation of the politics of magnanimity
finds in John Stuart Mill an illustrious antecedent. Mill’s lib-
eralism, Rapport observes, describes a template for a Society
of Anyone where the vision for a shared search for truth could
elevate the species and perfect the organization of society.
Now this requires of course adherence to a number of truth
conditions and truth steps: we must first agree on our political
epistemology. To this effect Rapport finds guidance and advice
in Karl Popper’s program for an open science.
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Mill’s and Popper’s programs are both inspired by a clas-
sical ploy of the liberal-contractarian tradition: the state of
nature account (SoNa). An original or inaugural or “etho-
logical” society (Mill’s never accomplished project; see Collini
1991:149) is defined that allows for the identification of a
number of functional terms for social life. Thus it is that
Hobbes identified the contractarian requisites of sovereignty,
that Hume derived the “artificial virtue” of justice, or that
John Rawls, through the use of his famous “veil of ignorance,”
identified a core set of “primary goods” underlying any system
of equal basic liberties.
SoNa has also been offered to help delineate the formal
traits of notions such as truth or knowledge. Bernard Wil-
liams’s (2002:44) elegant investigation into the problem of
truthfulness, for example, describes a SoNa to help him iden-
tify the “basic virtues of truth”: accuracy and sincerity. Like-
wise, Edward Craig (1990) has employed a SoNa to identify
the functional role that “knowledge” plays in liberal society,
such that asking questions about knowledge suddenly suggests
itself as a plausible project. Williams’s and Craig’s analyses
both point at the difficulties that putting “truth” and “knowl-
edge” to work in a political epistemology are likely to yield.
SoNas are of course minimalist models of functional social
life. They help represent as functional aspects of social and
individual life not previously seen in those terms. But as Wil-
liams (2002) notes, “We can give an account of truthfulness
and its value, I believe, in the particular philosophical mode
of a fictional genealogy, but . . . such an account is essentially
incomplete. . . . Culture and history fill in the abstract, fictional
account” (39).
I have dwelled on the role that SoNas perform in the tra-
dition of liberal philosophy because it is precisely this type
of account that is not made explicit in Rapport’s piece. Instead
Rapport offers us what we might dub a clever inversion of
the contractarian program: rather than departing from a
(minimalist) position of ignorance, he departs instead from
the vanishing point of magnanimous enlightenment. Not
what we know today, but the culmination of truth (about
human nature and human justice) that we must legitimately
aspire for: “a global knowledge of individuality to which hu-
manity might aspire.”
I admit I feel a little uneasy with this move, although I
concede it is a handy way of disposing of the perennial Is-
Ought problem in normative political theory. For although a
magnanimous philosophy is no doubt a very commendable
way of inflating the moral powers of the individual, I cannot
see how it can, of its own accord, help us delineate a theory
of political ethics. In the absence of a SoNa, no matter how
minimalist or skeletal, the magnanimous individual remains,
at heart, just that: an outline of a “sufficiently capacious”
(Mill) but ultimately vacuous individual. It is vacuous because
it has no world wherein to engage in the production of truth
and knowledge. Such an individual can have no knowledge
of truth, because he or she would not know whom to know
it for.
I have resorted to the notion of SoNa because it is the
standard formula of sociological supervenience in liberal phi-
losophy. I have other reservations about Rapport’s piece,
about his caricature of culturalist theory, or his rather con-
ventional (Popperian) sociology of science, but I have opted
instead to try to take his argument seriously in his own terms.
Let me conclude, however, on a point about the place of SoNa
in philosophical argument that, I think, brings to the fore the
radical importance of ethnographic description. SoNas aim
to understand how cooperation functions and what this func-
tioning brings forth. But they always, always take as their
point of departure a group of human beings who cooperate
but are not kin. Kinship is expressly disallowed in the theories
of politics and knowledge that develop thereof. Now how
magnanimous is that?
Simone Dennis
School of Archaeology and Anthropology, College of Arts
and Social Sciences, Australian National University, AD
Hope Building 14, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory
0200, Australia (simone.dennis@anu.edu.au). 8 V 11
Rapport’s offering is timely for those of us who confidently
operate within the comfortable parameters of what he terms
“cultural fundamentalism.” Rapport has made a habit of un-
settling anthropology’s comforts by proposing that we at least
consider our own dearly held assumptions. This, to my mind,
is always timely; we ought always be loathe to rest on our
laurels—and we generally are loathe to do so except, says
Rapport, when it comes to culture.
As Rapport himself points out, this is not likely to go down
well, given the “fashion” of culturalist discourses he sees dom-
inating our discipline. In this sense, Rapport takes untimely
issue with three claims he sees as characteristic of cultural
fundamentalism: (1) “that cultural belonging is foundational
of human identity,” (2) “that cultural difference is founda-
tional of other differences,” and (3) “that all knowledge is
culturally founded.” Pretty hard stuff to swallow, perhaps,
those of us who teach first-year anthropology might think,
whether it is because we have not looked at our wise words
(to bright-eyed students looking for something solid to hang
onto in a slippery disciplinary terrain) as a kind of discourse
or because we bristle with the very idea that such suggestions
could be made. It was not so very long ago that other sorts
of determinist explanations, such as Harris’s cultural mate-
rialism, were summarily rejected by a discipline increasingly
suspicious of the same accusation Rapport levels at cultural
determinism—that it is routinely and perhaps even unreflex-
ively drawn on “not as an idiom or vehicle for intersubjective
life, but [rather] its foundation [and] or final cause” (Jackson
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2002:125). One can track Rapport’s alternatives—indeed, he
is not so much interested in establishing that cultural deter-
minism is our primary recourse as he is in looking at its
consequences and to the opportunities that liberalism might
offer us. Here, the case is as clear as Rapport could put it.
So I will not deal here with the line of argument but rather
its foundation—the accusation that anthropology slavishly re-
fers to culture as its be all and end all with some pretty hefty
consequences that go to the heart of how we could relate to
one another. One question here concerns the faith anthro-
pology has in such a course of “cultural determinism”; has
anthropology arrogated itself to a position where such a plat-
form should be accepted? This is the sense in which Rapport’s
insights are timely and untimely.
Perhaps we should turn to other areas to examine the claim
before Rapport’s claims are put down to yet another part of
his case for the individual—that would be easy enough to do
given that we are familiar with his arguments and their coun-
ters. But if we value the practice of examining our own dis-
ciplinary bases, we should consider Rapport’s claims seriously.
Consider the basis of Rapport’s claims, for instance, in
mathematical context. In 1931, Go¨del developed his incom-
pleteness theorem, which, in essence, claimed that some math-
ematical systems, including arithmetic, could not be proved
true by recourse to their own bases; arithmetic cannot be
proved true using arithmetic. This is because arithmetic is
based on axioms and assumptions that cannot be, essentially,
proved using arithmetic as an explanans (see Go¨del 1931).
Go¨del thusly dealt an almighty blow to the dearly held dream
of making a mathematical foundation on which human reality
could be explained. The reaction was one of pessimism, even
gloom, even now. Gregory Chatlin, a mathematician currently
in the employ of IBM (at Watson Research Centre) recently
spoke with New Scientist magazine about his initial pessimism
regarding incompleteness (see Brooks 2011:37). He at first felt
that it presented walls and limits and shook the foundations
of a paradigm that he would rather have comfortably operated
within. Now, he holds that incompleteness theorem offers
new opportunity to come to know, as new ways must be
found, new paths followed. Is this not what Rapport wants
us to consider? Is he not urging us, no matter what one thinks
of his track record insofar as the individual is concerned, to
think about incompleteness and the benefits of discomfort?
About the notion that, in English, we are able to say “this
sentence is false” without abandoning language? To be able
to pursue mathematical explanations without the comfort of
already knowing? To conduct anthropological work without
the cultural comfort and its consequences? Rapport offers us
a sophisticated liberalist argument for so doing, and, one may
read that as one sees fit, this should at least be read with an
eye to what Rapport sees as the consequences for persons and
for the world and for the discipline if we remain wedded to
cultural determinism. But the guts of this piece go to comfort.
If it is false arithmetic, it might just be false anthropology,
too.
Thomas Fillitz
Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Univer-
sity of Vienna, Universitaetsstrasse 7, A-1010 Vienna, Aus-
tria (thomas.fillitz@univie.ac.at). 2 V 11
In this contribution, Nigel Rapport reflects on an “anthro-
pological approach to difference that reaches beyond the iden-
tification of customary opinion and communitarian exclu-
sivity . . . to secure true knowledge and its free individual
enjoyment on a global scale.” Rapport’s argument is embed-
ded within a liberal concept of “enlightened progress,” that
is, the production of truth as lived and individually discussed
and the rejection of cultural reification and essentialism. From
among the many ideas of this thought-provoking work, I shall
discuss three aspects: (a) the grading of “culture” into “civ-
ilization,” (b) the “being true to oneself” as condition for the
magnanimous overcoming of difference, and (c) the notion
of universal civilization in the context of objective human
knowledge.
Rapport argues that culture restricts any (free) knowledge
production, cultural fundamentalism being but an extreme
form of this fact. In doing so, the often articulated opposition
between cultural essentialism out there in society and the
processual understanding of culture in academia is not an
issue. The author replaces it by a transition of culture into
civilization, more precisely in combining the liberal choice of
individual life worlds and the universal progress of objective
knowledge. But we may wonder, what do people actually really
do within everyday life? Is the reference to cultural belonging,
in whichever form, an absolute one? According to Baumann
(1999), the same social actors who argue for the essentialist
notion of culture apply in their everyday activities the pro-
cessual understanding of culture, combining various elements
of the cultural flows occurring today. Baumann considers this
difference between words (essentialist culture) and activities
(processual culture) not as opposition but as complementary,
and he speaks of the “double discursive competence” of social
actors. This leads me to the opposition between “universal
civilization” and the “politics of histories and communities.”
Can we, on the basis of a specific European intellectual tra-
dition (Enlightenment) and after centuries of defining soci-
eties from the tradition of the colonial gaze, argue against
politics of self-determination, which emphasize own trajec-
tories within the cosmopolitan project of entangled modern-
ities (Randeria 1999) we are living in?
A central aspect of Rapport’s argument is the notion of
“being true to oneself,” the Cartesian cogito, a technique of
introspection that could allow one to overcome the simple
toleration of difference. The Indian Raji of Smith’s novel ob-
viously represents such an ideal type with his liberalism, free-
This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:39:51 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Rapport The Liberal Treatment of Difference 701
dom, and magnanimity in the awareness of others. I would,
however, understand Raji’s personality less from the viewpoint
of an “authentic center in the self.” Rather, I would like to
emphasize his “being in the world,” that is, Raji whose self
is a result of the social relations he has so far experienced,
although most were oppressive. Is not the experience of social
relationality constitutive for the experience of an other-aware-
ness beyond the toleration of difference? Instead of relying
on the Cartesian cogito in the context of present modernity,
I would suggest to shift toward the centrality of a relational
reflexivity, one that is embedded in networks and alliances
regarding flows of information and knowledge and charac-
terized by the access to or the exclusion from them (see Lash
2003).
Finally, I feel uncomfortable with the notion of a universal
civilization in connection with the right of all social actors
“to fit oneself with the best knowledge available that is uni-
versal.” I wonder, after terrible threats to our cosmopolitan
condition (e.g., think of Chernobyl and recently of Fukushima
and of the effects of climate change, etc.), how and from
whom these qualities of human knowledge may be defined
and globally circulated, considering that present Realpolitiken
are channeling and defining knowledge production and dis-
semination. I also question in this context the opposition
between universalism and the “traditionalist orientation”: we
may argue on the one hand that all citizens of the world have
a right to freely dispose of any tradition so far developed.
Exclusion from this freedom, however, is mostly due to mo-
nopolies of institutions such as states, transnational corpo-
rations, or market interests. On the other hand, this freedom
also incorporates the right of individuals and societies to insist
on their particular trajectories and therefore to acknowledge
their interconnected visions of and within the global world.
Universalism then becomes relational and multicentered. Of
course, Rapport displaces this multicentrism into the partic-
ularities of subjective worldviews and allegiances, but I feel
uncomfortable about the (monocentered?) universalities of
objective opportunities and truth, as this concept is embedded
within a European tradition.
David Gellner
School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, 51
Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PE, United Kingdom
(david.gellner@anthro.ox.ac.uk). 22 V 11
Anthropology—at least social and cultural anthropology—
finds its place in the academic marketplace as the study of
difference. Consequently, the bulk of anthropological writing
emphasizes different notions of personhood, gender, relat-
edness, and so on even to the point where it sometimes seems
as if anthropologists are intent on denying any universality
at all. When pressed, many, perhaps most, anthropologists
allow that it is a question of levels and that at some deep
level there has to be a common human nature, even if we
only ever encounter “encultured” humans. Despite such ad-
missions, there are not many cultural anthropologists who
see their task as specifying what that common humanity is
and still fewer who do so from a humanistic (rather than
natural-scientific) starting point. This makes Nigel Rapport’s
project all the more original and worthy of attention.
As always, Nigel Rapport’s paper is densely argued on the
basis of wide reading. I am impressed by his unambiguous
defense of liberal values and his attempt to put his finger on
the weak points in anthropological assumptions. I am im-
pressed too by his fearless insistence on “untimely” (as he
calls it) reading, bringing into anthropological discussion fig-
ures who rarely figure there (J. S. Mill, C. P. Snow, Karl
Popper) and unusual material—in this case from a novel. He
himself remarks that he may be viewed as “scarcely to have
departed from an idealist domain of novel, philosophical trea-
tise, and social-cum-moral commentary.”
I am less convinced, however, by his argument that an-
thropology necessarily tends toward the position he espouses.
It is true that the culturalist ways of thinking he attacks are
very common outside the academy, but contrary to the charge
that anthropology has merely connived in this, anthropolo-
gists have also been at the forefront in showing how these
are used strategically: whatever may be claimed in the political
arena and in the struggle for rights and resources, such cul-
turalist views do not make up people’s whole sense of them-
selves at the practical everyday level (e.g., Baumann 1996).
The epigraph Rapport attributes to my father, Ernest Gell-
ner, sounds authentic. My father certainly favored liberal tol-
erance as a political and ethical position but equally believed
that sloppy, self-indulgent, or intolerant thinking should be
contested at every opportunity. However, as the contribution
from anthropology he would have insisted on the necessity of
understanding, studying, and thinking about the social roots
of the cosmopolitan liberalism that Rapport proposes. Is it
to be found only among elites (Hannerz 1992), for example,
or equally among “working-class cosmopolitans” (Werbner
1999)? Does it require a separation of powers in the orga-
nization of the state, or can it flourish in other circumstances
as well?
Conversely, anthropology should also study—and I would
argue has studied—the conditions under which culturalist
thinking emerges, takes root, and spreads (e.g., Gellner 2009;
Handler 1988; Pfaff-Czarnecka and Toffin 2011; Shneiderman
and Turin 2006). As an anthropologist, what Rapport should
be arguing for is more and more subtle ethnographic study
of the different ways that people experience a common hu-
manity—for example, in situations where cultural difference
is highly valorized in the political domain (e.g., Quebec, India,
Belgium, etc.). It would be good if his engagement with the
actually existing ethnographic record was as enthusiastic as
his engagement with liberal philosophers.
Given that he takes Mill as his starting point, it is hardly
surprising that Rapport shares Mill’s optimistic view that truth
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and consensus will eventually emerge out of competing opin-
ions and ways of life. What that truth consists of—in terms
of propositions now generally agreed that were in the past
contentious—he does not specify. Equality for women, per-
haps?
In conclusion, therefore, it would be helpful if Rapport
were to distinguish more clearly when he is arguing as a
philosopher/literary critic and when he is pushing a specifi-
cally anthropological program. As far as the former is con-
cerned, he needs to explain how, in his view, progress toward
a shared truth has emerged from the clash of opinions and
what that shared truth consists of. He also needs to provide
further precision on the difference between natural-scientific
and anthropological modes of knowledge production as well
as on the different kinds of knowledge so produced. I would
not previously have placed him in the positivist camp, but in
what he has written here he opens himself to the charge that
he sees no fundamental difference between the sciences of
nature and the human sciences.
Tamara Kohn
Department of Anthropology, School of Social and Political
Sciences, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia
(tkohn@unimelb.edu.au). 23 V 11
Throughout his career, Nigel Rapport has produced a great
range of work that stimulates us with its “untimely” edge, its
rigor, its creativity, and its ability to provide much food for
thought. I have for a long time admired and followed Rap-
port’s faith in a “cosmopolitan anthropology,” and its de-
velopment in the paper above excites me and also challenges
me. I find I can only go so far as to believe in such faith’s
good intentions and intermittent applicability rather than its
universality and inevitability. I become troubled by the prob-
lem of how to embed such a faith in all aspects of my own
work even if it fits happily in much of it. Like Rapport, I feel
uncomfortable writing the words “truth,” “the nature of the
human,” “civilization,” and other vocabulary that he draws
on throughout this paper unless I can add qualifications that
specify the details of a particular voice or set of voices (“her
truth,” “Yakha understanding of human nature”). Perhaps
offering a reflexive comment that engages with questions of
anthropological pedagogy and ethnographic practice will en-
courage Rapport to consider how to feel less “sad” or “alien-
ated” through his noble efforts for our discipline.
I teach a very large introductory anthropology subject that
aims, above all else, to excite new students by the possibility
of understanding both that there are “others” with “different”
worldviews that will challenge their own common senses
about unilateral “truths” and, at the same time will allow them
to recognize that fundamentally we are all formed of the same
human clay. Diversity does not give way to sameness in such
pedagogical framing; it moves next to it in its capacity to
open new minds: the one challenge assists the other reali-
zation. Interestingly, the development of a Boasian notion of
“cultural relativity” and a “celebration of diversity” was an
early (and highly effective) attempt to develop an equal “treat-
ment of Anyone globally,” and yet now, here, “culture” is
presented as equal to “custom” and an antonym to “science”
and “truth”—as somehow a less than robust tool and an
impediment to liberal ideals. Culture, as an ever-reconstructed
signifier, is a helpful if imperfect tool that helps a teacher to
open a door to a world of ideas and foster a novice’s curiosity
about very different ways of knowing and living. Difference
itself can be revelatory particularly for students who are per-
haps too in tune with their own privileged and liberal self-
powers. Variety (of expression, experience, philosophy) is the
spice of anthropological life. Where, then, does a “liberal treat-
ment of difference” fit in the curriculum, and how, when,
and where can we best teach it?
I wonder too about how to apply such a philosophy on
the ground with my own research. I think of key informants
in my various “fields” and all the potentialities as well as
limitations that they experience. Alison can act out her “be-
coming” an islander in the Hebrides (contesting the spoken
boundaries of belonging that would exclude her), while Carol
in California is “transformed” through her daily body practice
in significant ways. Sarada in Nepal breaks consciously from
high caste rules to pollute her body at an untouchable’s home
in order to make a liberal political statement, but her “un-
touchable” host cannot move in the other direction. Not now.
And my job as anthropologist is as much to try to understand
her imprisonment, her feeling stuck, as it is to hope for her
freedom.
I also want to think about “magnanimity” as a “practical
virtue” (following C. P. Snow) in this work. I can find a perfect
example of its transformative power in my study of two men
on death row in California—men whose words, actions, and
reflections demonstrate that they “know something about
themselves and are appalled” and have to make themselves
(creatively) in the world before they leave it. Yes, these men
in that context are magnanimous in those senses. I would apply
Snow’s formulation and Rapport’s interpretation quite hap-
pily here. But what of those who, in the face of death (e.g.,
as suicide bombers, perhaps) are not at all appalled with what
they see of themselves (even if many others are)—who believe
themselves to be “authentic selves” acting “magnanimously”
within their own worlds, faiths, and families? Magnanimity
is not equally understood, because its components (“being
appalled,” “desiring to become better”) have been molded by
the many culturally informed ideas that nurture it.
I strive to share Rapport’s faith in the future. But I also
wonder, are my own liberal attractions to “virtuous pursuits”
and “best” practice, in my own life and in the activities of
many (but not all) of those whom I’ve worked with as “sub-
jects,” partly emerging out of a culturally shaped capacity to
see or imagine a much brighter world?
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Patrick Laviolette
Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Estonian
Humanities Institute, Tallinn University, Narva Mnt. 25,
10120 Tallinn, Estonia (patrick@ehi.ee). 16 V 11
What I did not foresee was the strong countercurrent to-
wards liberalism which emerged in the ’60s and reawak-
ened my interest.
(Gellner, quoted in Davis 1991:65)
Offering a comment, read “an opinion,” on any complex
meditation is bound to be tricky. This is especially so when
the author has deconstructed the very notion of opinion itself.
The bar has indeed been raised once it has been pointed out
just how dangerous lazy opinions can be. Fortunately, despite
many possible shortcomings, this is generally not what aca-
demics are prone to being. Slow, safe, conservative with a
small c, sure, at least sometimes, but not particularly lethargic
with ideas. Yet as we are reminded in the little manifesto
booklet Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology (Graeber
2004), academia in its basic premises, its ethos and rationale,
is an institution that has not changed much for centuries. Its
purposes and functions within society are still much the same
as they have been since medieval times. Nevertheless, even
though historical anthropology has significant cachet—and as
scholars we are constantly contextualizing our material the-
oretically and temporally—there is still a dearth of reflexivity
when it comes to understanding not the origins of our ideas
as such but certainly the symbols and ceremonies of our
lifestyle or worldviews.
Edmund Leach (1984) and Alfred Gell (1999) have fa-
mously examined ivory-tower rituals and legacies. My feeling
is that Nigel Rapport is doing something quite similar here,
similarly grand in its intent. Obviously his piece is important
because of the subject matter—the propagation of humanist
principles, ideals, and historical developments—however
comprehensively contested they have occasionally been (e.g.,
Fanon 1961). But for my purposes here, I am not especially
interested in bringing out or highlighting the subtleties of
such debates. Instead, I suppose my main point is that this
piece is particularly evocative because of its double, maybe
even its treble, reflexivity. This exists in a thread of connec-
tions about moral philosophies of difference that take us back
to the formalization of ways to think about the world dif-
ferently at the height of modernity in the scholastic realm—
a realm that was then going through one of its few profound
altercations over the past 800 years—a realization and oc-
casional acceptance of the desire to actually strive to change
the world. Rapport is well placed to chronicle this humanist
history, both geographically and intellectually. Indeed, his own
form of existential anthropology and liberal cosmopolitanism
(or is that cosmopolitan liberalism?) seems to have grown
out of these types of humanist musings put forth by many
proponents of the post-Scottish enlightenment.
One is not being magnanimous in singing the praise for
this article’s profound development of an argument. The text
is itself full of fascinating wordplay and double entendre. As
a thought piece about the anthropology of humanity and
truth, it is sophisticated precisely because it does not proclaim
to be about the Other or even to be about some generic form
of Western thought. Ultimately it starts and ends “at home”—
within our very own type of ancient social institution—with
all its privileges, flaws, freedoms, and potential prickliness.
And so to criticize Rapport for “naively” referring to human
nature, or facts, would be to completely miss the point. As
he himself admits in relation to speaking of humanism, we
are bound to be uncomfortable here with such terms, concepts
chosen to tap into as well as to trap our misgivings not only
as “Westerners” but as “Western intellectuals.”
If I understand correctly, part of Rapport’s argument is to
suggest that however banal Thatcher’s infamous message from
the late 1980s was at the time, there is a certain sense in which
it has latterly begun to manifest itself more evidently. There
increasingly appears to be less and less of such a thing as
Society. For this reason, the acceptance of the maxim for a
bounty of social tolerance is also in decline. By extension, the
world is becoming more capable of rationally justifying a lack
of tolerance, said to be of the intellectual sort but which is
really a disguised way of propagating social intolerance. Xeno-
phobia, hatred, fear, and distrust thus become the norm with
greater ease and with greater support from the intelligentsia
no less.
Rapport’s vision of the magnanimous overcoming of dif-
ference is an affront to this travesty whereby a notion as
absurd as the nonexistence of society could even become a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Social anthropologists, even those
with right-wing leanings (and we know they did and still do
exist), were obviously not prepared to accept this idea of there
being no society, big or small, homogenous or multicultural.
And for this among other reasons, we are duty bound to heed
the call of laying claim to this as well as other such discourses,
untimely as they may be.
Ton Otto
Institute of Anthropology, Archaeology and Linguistics,
University of Aarhus, Moesgaard, 8270 Hojbjerg, Denmark
(ton.otto@hum.au.dk). 26 IV 11
Nigel Rapport confronts the reader with an important ques-
tion, and he has the guts to take an “unfashionable” position.
His article disappoints though by failing to provide a sub-
stantive anchoring of this position in the scholarship of the
discipline. The tension between universalism and relativism
is one of the key themes in the history of anthropology. Dis-
cussing two important liberal writers, John Stuart Mill and
C. P. Snow, both attached to the University of St. Andrews
and spanning a century between them, Rapport feels inspired
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to take a universalist stance: “because these are objectives that
I believe are there to be addressed—the truth about the in-
dividual and the human whole—and to which I would lay
disciplinary claim.” He explores how universal human truth
can be established so that “‘opinion’ grades into ‘knowledge,’
. . . ‘culture’ grades into ‘civilization’ and local community
(polis) into global society (cosmos).” His article is a reflection
on how liberalism can be translated into “a cosmopolitan
anthropology.”
These are noble goals; the authors that inspire Rapport are
noble thinkers reflecting on issues such as individual liberty
and magnanimity. Rapport wishes to defend the possibility
of a single truth for humankind as a whole and writes against
what he calls “culturalism,” which is the opposite extreme on
the gamut between universalism and relativism. According to
Rapport, culturalism is the fashion today, and therefore he
sees his own essay as “untimely.” I do not think that this
characterization of contemporary anthropology is accurate.
Culturalism is certainly loose on the streets, and therefore it
may be a good idea, as Wikan (1999) suggests, for anthro-
pologists to write against it, but in my assessment anthro-
pologists themselves have generally been careful not to es-
sentialize holistic concepts such as culture and society for
several decades (Bubandt and Otto 2010). Rapport’s own de-
piction of the culturalist discourse includes Evans-Pritchard
(1937) and a statement on human rights by the American
Anthropological Association (1947). These are hardly con-
temporary sources, thus confirming that this is a recurrent
theme replayed in a contemporary idiom.
My main point of critique is that Rapport’s article appears
to lightly sidestep the overwhelming anthropological evidence
for the key role that habits, customs, cultural patterns, and
institutions play in human life. His essay is discursive in na-
ture and based on reading philosophers and novelists. Eth-
nographic studies are hardly referred to. With the founders
of liberalism Rapport appears to share a deep-seated belief
that individualism without constraints will lead to the best
outcome for humankind as a whole. In the economic sphere,
the pitfalls of a “free market” have recently been confirmed
by the global economic crisis, which forced governments
worldwide to intervene and regulate. Following Mill and Pop-
per, Rapport appears to profess a free-market model of uni-
versal truth. If everyone is allowed to express their opinion
freely, opinion will grade into knowledge. The problem is that
this does not happen by itself, as Mill, Popper, and also Rap-
port have to admit. “Certain conditions must be met for this
to occur.” But this is the crux of the problem. These con-
ditions are frequently not met, and in order to make open
criticism possible—I fully agree on this as one of the cor-
nerstones of scientific knowledge—certain forms of institu-
tionalization have to be put in place that warrant freedom of
speech and independent research (e.g., peer-reviewed aca-
demic journals).
Although I readily agree on the need to create a space for
free inquiry and discussion in the pursuit of truth—which is
potentially universal—it is exactly the how of this that needs
research and reflection as part of a cosmopolitan anthropol-
ogy. Here Rapport’s article fails to offer substance and direc-
tion, also in its brief “envoi” on overcoming difference. In
my view anthropology should continue to study how cultural
differences—a central aspect of social life—frequently but not
necessarily lead to social and intellectual closure and reifi-
cation. Analyzing these processes of boundary drawing and
naturalization may give us clues on how to overcome “the
despotism of custom” (Mill). The problem with Rapport’s
“solution” is its one-sidedness: it focuses on the human in-
dividual on the one hand and humankind as whole on the
other. There is a whole world of phenomena in between, or
rather numerous cultural “worlds” being continuously created
and changed by human beings living in groups and relating
to each other and their environment. Understanding how this
continuous process of “worlding” (Tsing 2010) relates to
claims for universal truth is certainly a central concern and
project of anthropology.
David Shankland
Royal Anthropological Institute, 50 Fitzroy Street, London
W1T 5BT, United Kingdom (david.shankland@TheRAI
.org.uk). 21 V 11
Rapport’s timely piece is beautifully written and enriched with
surprising allusions—I imagine that few anthropologists will
have come across Snow’s lecture to the University of St. An-
drews. Rapport is, of course, quite right. If anthropology can
be said to have a sole aim, it is the search after truth. Of all
the methods developed within the social sciences aimed at
learning about the diversity of human societies, it is still the
most effective and the most accurate. Other benefits may
stem—we hope that they will—from the pursuit of anthro-
pology. However, it is only because it is better than the others
that we continue to practice it. It is only because it can develop
truer accounts than other disciplines that we are in a position
to argue that listening to anthropologists is worthwhile. To
say, shyly, that it provides a “different” perspective is to lose
the battle before it is even begun. Anthropology is different
because it can provide a truer account of social life than any
other method. This can be the only justification for our claim
for a privileged seat in the public sphere.
Rapport’s equally unusual juxtaposition of Popper and Mill
is equally insightful. Popper has never quite received his due
from anthropologists.1 Perhaps this was because of Popper’s
attack on socialism, which still can irritate and anger those
on the left even today. Nevertheless, Popper regarded himself
1. With the notable exception perhaps of Professor Michael Banton,
whose distinguished career in the academic and international public
sphere—Banton became chair of the UN Committee for the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination—was underpinned by a strong sense of Pop-
perian philosophy.
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as a humanist. It also may be noted that Popper used the
word “essentialist”—indeed he appears to have coined the
term—to attack positivism in exactly the same way as every-
day academic anthropological discourse does in our day (Pop-
per 1960). Indeed, just as is so frequently reiterated today,
Popper’s starting point in his attack on positivism is that there
is no straightforward access to the external world and no
conclusive answer. From this, however, he goes on to argue
that such an insight does not necessitate our ceasing in our
search for why and how some explanations may be better
than others. It is this second step that appears to have become
atrophied within contemporary anthropological practice, per-
haps under the mistaken impression that to distinguish be-
tween explanations necessitates a return to positivism.
We should applaud, then, Rapport’s fresh insistence that a
liberal public sphere and a search after truth are both possible
and necessary bedfellows. This, in areas of the world where
university and academic freedom are under threat, such as in
the United Kingdom, must remain a lodestone to be sought
and defended. Such a defense may be passive in the sense
that a gifted teacher can do a great deal still today to resist
from within his or her university. But it may too be practical:
personal action may be linked to the sort of intellectual clarity
that anthropology may bring. In other words, an anthropo-
logical search after truth can combine with a sense of liber-
alism to facilitate a practical life that does not have to be
rooted in the university. Snow’s public career is an excellent
example of this, and Rapport is quite right to call attention
to the anthropological nature, the rich ethnography, of Snow’s
great series of novels. Looked at from this point of view,
anthropology as an intellectual discipline overlaps with but is
certainly not confined to academia. Rapport’s article helps us
to articulate why this may be so.
What is less clear is the significance Rapport’s conclusions
have for our internal argument, as it were, as to the wider
place of social or cultural anthropology within anthropology
as a whole. If all human cultures are united (or even if they
all have the common cultural capacity to learn), then there
would appear to be no reason why the biological unity of
humans should not again be a central tenet of anthropological
enquiry. Replacing “diversity” with “unity” is thus potentially
a helpful approach to anthropology’s public engagement, but
equally it could help to reunify anthropology itself. Marett,
one of the last of the Victorian anthropologists in Britain, is
now almost entirely unread. Yet his Anthropology (Marett
1912) resonates still with its trenchant universalism: “Let any
and every portion of human history be studied in the light
of the whole history of mankind. . . . Anthropology . . . aims
at truth for truth’s sake. Knowing by parts is science, knowing
the whole as a whole is philosophy. Each supports the other”
(12). Perhaps removing the stress on difference would help
us to heal our own internal differences as well as benefit our
place in the public sphere.
Reply
I am very grateful for the quality of the questions posed. I
may not do their complexity justice, and perhaps I do little
more than paraphrase. But let me isolate 11 trenchant queries,
further dividing these into three themes, and imagine that I
respond to each commentator as a conversational protagonist.
1. Relations between Rationality,
Morality, and Culture
Alberto Corsı´n Jime´nez asks: To give an account of truthfulness
and its value, do we not need a cultural and historical context?
Otherwise it is fictional—purporting an original State of Nature.
Is not Anyone an ultimately vacuous figure without a preexisting
world wherein to engage in the production of truth, a world
that provides context for “knowledge,” a world centrally focused
on kinsfolk?
Let me answer, Alberto, by imagining in the figure of Any-
one my daughter, Emilie, now aged 12. Albeit that Emilie’s
identity has always been expressed by way of cultural sym-
bologies, it became clear to her parents early on that Emilie
knew in her own way: what she knew, how she knew it, and
why. From the outset, Emilie, I say, was her own person; in
your terms, Emilie embodies an original State of Nature. I
mean this physiologically as well as psychologically: according
to the best knowledge available to me, I recognize Emilie’s
identity as being unique (she has not been here on earth before
and she will not be again). This makes her time here both
special and, I would claim, precious. Emilie’s life is a thing
in itself, with a value of its own, independent of the contin-
gencies of culture and history; this “context” is irrelevant both
to Emilie’s identity and to her preciousness.
So far as possible I would wish for a historical world not
to intrude: for Emilie’s/Anyone’s life to be tied to no tradition,
no collectivity, no sense of duty other than what s/he attests
or invents. Anyone inevitably knows for him- or herself—it
is intrinsic to embodiment—and I wish for Anyone to have
the right to live that knowledge fully: to fulfil the human
capacity for producing personal knowledge and truth. Any-
one’s “vacuousness”—or “gratuitousness” (Rapport 2008)—
relative to what preexists is only another way of expressing
Anyone’s absolute integrity.
Vered Amit retorts: Is, however, the search for a moral po-
sition on the relationship between anthropology, truth, and
global society the most effective way to undertake empirical an-
thropological inquiry? Is not a moral modeling of the world
counterproductive for discovering how it works? To morally ad-
dress individuality is to close off avenues to its objective inves-
tigation.
I find it difficult to disentangle the moral from the objective,
Vered. Anthropology and other human sciences tell us more
and more about the nature of individual human embodiment.
I appreciate, for instance, Gerald Edelman’s (1992) work on
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the biological individuality of the brain and its unique de-
velopment in each body. How we come to be embodied is
individual; how we occupy an environment is a matter of
individual bodily homeostasis. Each of us might be conceived
of as inhabiting a unique environmental dwelling constituted
by a lifetime of individual engagements with the world around
us, so that self and self’s dwelling place are constructed in
tandem (Rapport 2003:215–239). At the same time, individ-
uality owes its unique nature to its humanity: this is its ob-
jective context. The “cosmopolitan” project of anthropology
I take to be the task of knowing the dialectical relation: in-
dividuality out of humanity (Rapport 2012).
Individuality is an objective component in empirical reality.
The earth’s position in the solar system is another. Further
anthropological investigation into “how the world works” then
accommodates these truths while closing off no avenues of
research. One asks: how are these truths lived, in the context
of particular individual lives and particular social relations, par-
ticular historical traditions and cultural cosmologies? If I find
ignorance, I feel that I also have an anthropological duty in
this regard. If a public discourse of geocentrism with regard to
the earth, for instance—or dividualism or collective conscious-
ness or communitarianism with regard to individuality—neg-
atively affects the quality of life—that precious and finite sin-
gularity—of human beings, then there are moral consequences
to my investigation that I must not detach. Of course, my
anthropological investigation might itself deliver new objective
truths—concerning, say, the properties of plants or character-
istics of human creativity. But the investigation into objectivity
is neither confused with a moral duty nor wholly separate from
it: given the truth of human nature and of individual embod-
iment, what is their due? how might human-individual capa-
bilities and liabilities be best serviced by social organization and
acknowledged in cultural symbologies?
Tamara Kohn asks: Is not “culture” a helpful if imperfect
tool, a signifier continually to be reconstrued? Does it not help
the anthropological pedagogue open the doors to otherness and
to the need for global equal treatment? Are not practices every-
where culturally informed—limited and capacitated—including
imagining a better world?
My fearfulness stems, Tamara, from the conviction that
“culture” is the wrong unit for this, assigning difference to
the wrong level and misconstruing the kinds of difference:
symbolic or rhetorical as against ontological. I find “culture”
being used to defend claims to what is untrue and unjust,
legitimating ignorant treatment of individuals and defending
intransigence. “Culture” translates into an essentialization of
memberships of symbolic classes and a reification of collec-
tives. “Culture” transforms identities and relations into sup-
posedly uniform consensuses and matters of collective ad-
judication, traditions often tied to supernatural revelation that
must be respected and upheld for their own sakes. For in-
stance, Bhikhu Parekh’s (1994:13) antiliberal claims are not
only erroneous but pernicious: “Since human beings are cul-
turally embedded, respect for them entails respect for their
cultures and ways of life. . . . Cultures are spiritual creations
of their relevant communities.” I am fearful of lending the
wrong kind of credence and legitimacy to a kind of construc-
tion of human life that is fictional, not ontological, so that
culture becomes a kind of ghetto or prison: “You are this
kind of human being, born in this community, this tradition,
this religion.”
There is only one kind of human being. At the same time,
difference is an individual property, a manifestation of the
paradoxical relation that sees human unity expressed as in-
dividually embodied particularity. I would like my anthro-
pology to teach otherness as an individual possession. This
means making the world safe from culture understood as
foundational and symbolic classifications understood as ob-
jective. Cultural traditions are to be appreciated aestheti-
cally—as opinion, not knowledge—and treated as matters of
taste, freely adopted or denied. To help make the world safe
for Anyone—a world of equal treatment and of diverse prac-
tices—is to promote knowledge of who is to be equally treated
and who practices, who knows, and who has rights. Even
when individuals are members of groups, it is they who re-
main the bearers of identities: to teach respect for difference
is to teach respect for identity individually chosen and em-
bodied. Anthropology teaches that “culture” pertains to the
domain or level of opinion: a lifestyle option. Culture’s aes-
thetic expressions—personal or shared—may resonate deeply
with individuals’ senses of who they are. But as claims to
knowledge, they are treated ironically. For not all practices
are culturally informed; increasingly they can be objectively
informed. Part of the work of anthropology—a vital part—
is now to work out an accommodation of “culture” within
“civilization” so that different cultural tastes can be practiced
and so that none infringes on Anyone’s capacity and right to
(re-)formulate his or her own tastes.
Ton Otto objects: Have not anthropologists in recent decades
avoided conceptualizing culture and society as essential wholes?
On the other hand, is it not naive to prescribe a free-market
model of universal truth—of individuals’ opinions grading into
knowledge—without an appreciation of the key role that social
processes of habitualization and naturalization continually play?
Human beings create cultural worlds together in the contexts of
customs, institutions, and hegemonies.
I do not think that “free market” is the correct metaphor,
Ton, to describe Mill’s conception of individuals being at
liberty to formulate, express, and inhabit their own opinions.
(The metaphor leads to a confusion of political or moral
liberalism with an economic “neoliberalization.”) Mill’s image
is more anarchic. There is no call to “enter a market” to buy
or sell opinions. Rather, “This is Anyone’s view: that is Anyone
else’s: each has a right to live by his or hers alone.”
Nor do I think it is a “hegemonic” imposition to place
something at a higher epistemological level than opinion,
namely, knowledge. Archbishop Ussher’s opinion that the
world was created on the night preceding Sunday, October
23, 4004 BC, has been replaced by archaeological knowledge.
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Other knowledge—astronomical, medical, psychological—
now supervenes on the opinion that gods live in clouds above
Mount Olympus, that Jews caused bubonic plague, that a
female station in life demands modesty, humility, and shame-
fastness. I am well aware of the consequences that “processes
of habitualization and naturalization” can play on human
social life. It is precisely the potential despotism of such cus-
tomization that I am keen to avert.
To avoid essentialist and holist versions of society and cul-
ture is to insist that there is one world, inhabited by different
individuals. Customary “worlds” of symbolic classifications
may extrude themselves between humanity and individuality,
but such “worldings” (communities, castes, religions, etc.) are
aesthetic matters, to be regulated so that individual subjec-
tivities might find free expression. This is an idealistic project
but not one without “substance and direction.”
In Ton’s objection I find echoes of David Gellner’s, when
he asserts: An anthropological study is ethnographically to un-
derstand the social conditions under which ways of thinking—
“cosmopolitan,” say, as well as “culturalist”—emerge, take root,
and spread. And does not the ethnographic record also document
the strategic nature of deployments of ways of thinking at the
practical everyday level? Subtle ethnography reveals people ex-
periencing a common humanity even in situations that valorize
cultural difference. And echoes, too, of Michał Buchowski’s
query: Can we not aspire to a “relativized rationality,” defined
not in relation to “human nature,” “truth,” and “goodness” but
to the options that the mundane pragmatics of culture and
power, social relations and hierarchy, make available? We strive
for better forms of knowledge and the rejection of irrational
beliefs, but we do so amid the complexities of particular lives.
Yes, but I want to recognize that while we undertake our
search for knowledge from within the complexities of lives
ensconced in social relations, hierarchies, and cultural habi-
tualities, Michał, and while our ideas emerge, take root, and
spread in particular social conditions, David, that we also
possess the capacity to reach truths that transcend the par-
adigms, the terms, and the practices that led to their acqui-
sition. Some truths can be revolutionary in this way: the
wheel; the printing press; the mapping of the genome; the
brain scanning that, for instance, leads us to know the relation
between gazing on a loved one and gazing on favored works
of art. I would distinguish between, say, the pleasure that I
get from gazing on Stanley Spencer’s paintings and the “plea-
sure response” that science now recognizes as a specieswide
capacity of our individual human embodiment. I think Pop-
perian worlds are one way to formulate this distinction. On
one level there is the substance of particular lives: I cite Popper,
Michał cites Robin Horton, and David cites Gerd Baumann.
On another level I wish to put our human-individual capac-
ities to cite as well as rights to cite. And a hierarchical relation
should be seen to obtain between these: because I have the
human-individual capacity to cite, thereby I do my substan-
tive citing; because I have the human-individual capacity to
cite, thereby I should have the right do my substantive citing.
Nor am I so convinced that ethnography vouchsafes an
appreciation of either anthropologists or their informants ex-
periencing human universality (David) or rejecting irrational
beliefs (Michał). Consider the current fashionableness of
“Amerindian perspectivism” and incommensurate sociocul-
tural worlds. Appreciation of Amazonian cosmologies en-
courage a redefinition of the “classical categories” of “nature,”
“culture,” and “supernature,” we are informed, for here are
humans, the dead, jaguars, tapirs, and so on, possessing one
culture while existing in multiple natures: one epistemology,
multiple ontologies (Viveiros de Castro 1998). Bruno Latour
(2004) elaborates: the “awesome multiplicity” found in Am-
azonian cosmologies repudiates all claims to “mononatur-
ism”—to there being one nature, one world, and one hu-
manity whose truths reason and science disclose. Any
“composition” of one world can only be a negotiation by a
“pluriverse” of “entities” at present “owned” and inhabited
by a “freight of gods, attachments, and unruly cosmos” (La-
tour 2004:454–457); one must admit the common con-
structed or “cultured” nature of a diversity of worlds before
negotiations toward substantive commonalities can even be-
gin. Failing this, the “fundamentalism” of scientific “natur-
alizers” (appealing to “Nature Out There”) and the funda-
mentalism of radical Islam (appealing to the revelation of the
Koran and Sharia) wage war without end (Latour 2004:459–
460).
This is not helpful. The fact that all human knowledge is
“constructed” in the sense of being made out using particular
methods and by virtue of particular traditions of discovery
does not mean that all such knowledge possesses the same
factuality. The status of scientific facts is not the same as
religious facts, for instance. The latter might fall into a cat-
egory of “constructivism”—“dependent on series of [human]
mediations,” “[apt to] fail and thus requiring careful main-
tenance and constant repair” (Latour 2004:458–459)—but the
world to which science provides insight has no need of our
cultural “life-support systems” and their histories. We can
know this world, we can adapt ourselves to it, we can even
know how to adapt it to our desires, partially, but there is
no way in which its realities might “fail” in the way that
cultural paradigms of knowing might fail. Our “construction”
of knowledge thus gives onto different kinds of facts: some
are aesthetic in character, matters of personal taste, and some
are empirical in character, matters of rational discernment.
“Culture” is the name I would give to sets of aesthetic
judgements; “nature” a domain of universal truths. To dis-
tinguish the two is fundamental for a progression in human
knowledge.
2. The Pragmatic Approach to
Difference, and Ethnography
I think Simone Dennis is being magnanimous when she sug-
gests: If it were admitted that a culturalist discourse was based
on axioms, assumptions, and systemizations that were circular—
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that could only prove their own validity in a tautological
fashion—then would there not be benefits to the initial sense of
discomfort we, as anthropologists, might feel? Disciplinarity is
paradigmatic, not a self-sufficient form of knowledge, and “cul-
ture” must remain an incomplete way to explain human reality.
You are giving my argument the benefit of the doubt,
Simone, because you see the bases of disciplines as also being
the biases of disciplines, and hence the need for any such
periodically to be reassessed. It is for reasons of our practical
effectiveness beyond the academy that anthropology’s “cul-
ture” should be interrogated.
I find Simone to be in tune with Patrick Laviolette when
he argues: Academic institutionalism, its symbols and cere-
monies, ethos and rationale, has functioned over the centuries
to assist the reproduction and structuration of society. But let
us at least imagine that the claim of academia in a humanist
modernity to desire to change the world for the better were
disinterested. Does this not afford a pragmatic means to chal-
lenge social intolerance and xenophobia?
I see you as casting a critical (anarchic) eye, Patrick, over
all academic claims to righteousness. We must be sceptical
and scrupulous with regard both to our claims to indepen-
dence of thought and to any mundane mouthings concerning
policies of tolerance. Indeed, if no claims may be taken at
face value, for the biases and hypocrisies and strategies their
rhetorics will clothe, then pragmatism is the only kind of
truth: does this piece of sophistry have better consequences
for the world than that?
Here, too, in the world of best practice, I would place
Thomas Fillitz when he attests: Those who argue for essential
cultures actually practice a broader discursive competency, com-
bining in their everyday lives various elements from global cul-
tural flows. And is not this self-determination of identities and
trajectories the form of political freedom that we should be es-
pousing in a postcolonial world: a multicentered universalism
based on local social relations and reflexivities?
If I were to give your strategic essentialists the benefit of
the doubt, Thomas, it would be to esteem an “ironical” con-
sciousness in community membership. Community can pos-
sess a Janus-facedness, in Anthony Cohen’s (1978) descrip-
tion. When a community deploys a rhetoric of unity in
dealings with the outside world, this operates both as a mech-
anism of solidarity and as a veneer to internal differentiation:
we are Arsenal Football Club/China/Islam; we are the best;
none is like us. But a liberal society calls for a kind of reg-
ulation whereby two things are guaranteed. First, the essen-
tialist rhetoric does not have unwanted consequences for out-
siders. Second, the rhetoric does not have unwanted effects
on members’ capacities to go on formulating their own life
projects: at the same time as Anyone practices Islam according
to his or her satisfaction, he or she practices gay clubbing or
even Judaism. To promote Thomas’s self-determination of
identities and trajectories in a multicentered universalism is
to ensure that Anyone is recognized as being a paradigmatic
exemplar of universal humanity. It is Anyone’s freedom to
determine his or her worldviews, life projects, and relations,
including community memberships. Irony is called for also
to recognize that the freedom to hold all manner of opinion
cannot translate into the unfreedom of others having to take
that opinion seriously or otherwise have it effect their lives.
Anyone has no necessary case to answer in the court of Anyone
else’s caprice.
It is in the way of pragmatism, finally, that I understand
Simon Coleman’s comments concerning anthropology’s
workability. He asks: Is a model of universal truth as natural
science and literary fiction might promote best suited to a world
where social and political conditions lead to an insistence on
parochial difference? Do we not need ethnographic method (in-
stead of scientific method) to transcend communitarian closures
and open up an exchange of ideas—including how to judge
“truthfulness” free from institutional authorization?
“Open up” is the key term, Simon, I think. I see “open”
versus “closed” cutting across distinctions between “ethno-
graphic method” and others. Openness is an overriding value,
one previously exalted in anthropology (by the likes of Max
Gluckman and Robin Horton) as much as in science or lit-
erature. I would hope for an anthropological method that
aims to know those open social arrangements that remove
obstacles to Anyone’s free, unique, and continuous becoming.
Openness in anthropology translates into an appreciation of
human life’s open-endedness: our individual capacity to be-
come (Rapport 2001).
If Anyone’s life is a unique embodiment, then futurity is
what I would work to ensure as a birthright: the potential of
a life of uniquely embodied capacities that is open to Anyone
at every moment of his or her existence. E. M. Forster con-
fided to his locked diary: “how annoyed I am with Society
for wasting my time by making homosexuality criminal”
(cited in Parker 2011:4). I would work out those social ar-
rangements whereby globally the unique preciousness of an
individual life is never brought to unnecessary closure, never
stunted or maimed by the prescriptions of cultural traditions,
others’ aesthetic classifications, others’ histories, others’ com-
munitarian parochialism.
3. “Anthropology”: Inscribing Human
Singularity
David Shankland observes: Why should not the biological unity
of humans again be a central tenet of anthropological enquiry?
Replacing an emphasis on difference with commonality might
unify anthropology as a human science (social, cultural, physical,
archaeological) as well as establish a signal and liberal stance
in intellectual exchange: “Anthropology” works to establish the
truths of social life, including how some human explanations
are better than others.
I welcome your hopefulness, David. The case against hop-
ing for an anthropology that progresses toward truth, mean-
while, is succinctly put by John Gray’s Enlightenment’s Wake
(1995). The Enlightenment project, Gray declaims, to displace
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customary moralities and traditional forms of supernatural-
ism by a universal critical and rational civilitude is dead. The
cosmopolitan hope to see differences of cultural tradition
becoming voluntary aspects of a private sphere of lifestyle
choices is delusionary. Most of the world’s population still
experiences culture as rivalrous, exclusionary ways of life in
which membership is unchosen; identity derives from others’
sanction and manifests itself in conflict and historical me-
morializations of enmity: culture as fate (Gray 1995:124).
I find in such (anti)triumphalist declamations vital dis-
tinctions being threatened. There are different kinds or grades
of truth. “Civilization” might be that accumulation of truths
whose factuality is independent of discourse: the accumula-
tion of “natural facts” or “knowledge.” There are different
kinds of things in the world and different kinds of difference.
“Individuality” might be the difference that inheres in human
embodiment, an essential difference that expresses itself
through cultural symbologies but that is absolutely distinct
from these. Individuality possesses an objectivity that subsists
irrespective of its recognition or valuation; supernaturalism,
communitarianism, traditionalism do not. To have equal re-
spect for all human beings is not according equal respect to
cultures (as “ways of life” and “spiritual creations” of “com-
munities”) but guaranteeing that Anyone lives under the aegis
of the best knowledge available.
In the spirit of Robert Marett, I perhaps conclude, David:
“natural facts for their own sake,” while “aesthetics facts” (or
opinions) do not exist “for their own sake” because they
possess no ownness that is not individually conferred and
should not be deemed to.
My intent remains practical: an anthropology that delivers
objective truths and liberal freedoms. Binding together this
cosmopolitan program is the subjectivity of human experi-
ence.
Stephen Spender2 praises Kierkegaard for his insight into
the “oneself” of everyone that “moves outwards towards other
people and towards society from isolated being.” The “reality
and force” of this subjectivity have tended to be misjudged,
inadequately accommodated, if not denied outright in “out-
ward living,” Spender elaborates, pressed into the role of “so-
cial unit” in a fictional “public.” Might not modern civili-
zation offer more to everyone’s unique subjectivity than
“oppression” and misappropriation?
This praise by poet of philosopher would seem to me an
entirely anthropological sympathy. Indeed, it accords with
anthropology’s specific methodology as a science: its ethno-
graphic aspiration to enter into the life world of any human
being. The anthropological informant is Anyone. No one is
denied a voice, whether on analytic grounds or moral. It is
Anyone’s due, I would contend, to have his or her individual
integrity respected, not reduced to that of a category or class.
2. Spender, S. Ca. 1955. The man inside. This article was cut out from
a newspaper or magazine and did not include any identifying information
regarding the source of publication. The article reviewed Kierkegaard,
edited by W. H. Auden (Cassell, 1955).
Before any supposed intersubjective relation (of love, consen-
sus, cooperation, exploitation, oppression, resistance) can be
claimed, Anyone’s subjective consciousness must be hazarded.
The substance of individual lives may incorporate collective
labels and idioms, but these attributes of “outward living”
have no a priori warrant on the qualia of those lives. Doing
justice to subjective existence—both in objective analysis and
in global morality—I would see as anthropology’s civiliza-
tional promise.
—Nigel Rapport
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